Jindal’s “Battle”:
The Cultural Logics beneath Bobby Jindal’s Pathetic Terrorist Metaphor

J. R. Collins | University of Alaska, Anchorage

In August of 2014 the Governor of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal, released a statement declaring his intent to sue President Obama and the Department of Education. This article analyzes the pathetic language used in that statement and finds a surprising metaphor comparing the President to a terrorist, as well as a parallel with a pattern Kenneth Burke found in his analysis of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. I include research on emotion and affect theory in my methodology and show how Jindal’s rhetoric could benefit from a more invitational approach than the extreme persuasive approach he has taken. I conclude by calling on rhetoricians to take note of discourse that follows such a pattern and for public speakers to consider invitational rhetoric as a means of opening a dialogue and working towards solutions.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

In the summer of 2014, the Governor of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal, released a statement through the Office of the Governor announcing his intent to sue the federal government over the Common Core State Standards (CCSS). The statement, titled “Governor Jindal Sues Federal Government Over Common Core,” is written by an unnamed author with a number of quotes attributed to Governor Jindal. The statement released through Governor Jindal’s office employs a register that is relatively cordial when juxtaposed with the emotionally charged language—a hallmark of Jindal’s public discourse—in the governor’s own quoted passages. It is in these quoted passages that Jindal’s own affect and consequent pathetic appeals (pathetic stemming from the word pathos, referring to emotion) are openly displayed, appeals that suggest a malicious entrapment of parents and the Louisiana state education system by the federal government. This sense of entrapment persists throughout the statement, and with it, Jindal pursues a neoliberal objective that he subtly ties to the identity of parents. The primary neoliberal cultural logic in the statement’s discourse is that of personal responsibility, which eschews social programs from institutions like the Department of Education. Governor Jindal’s pathetic discourse links this neoliberal cultural logic with the interest of parents in their children’s education by constructing a common enemy in President Obama and the Department of Education. Creating a common enemy through pathetic arguments is a rhetorical move common to neoliberalism, which lacks the constructive prospect of invitational rhetoric.
Invitational rhetoric is that which invites a dialogue between all parties and treats those parties as equally capable of a significant contribution to the conversation. Persuasive rhetoric—of which Jindal’s is an extreme case—seeks to change and even control its audience’s perception. Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin, in their article “Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,” coin the phrase invitational rhetoric and detail the differences between invitational and persuasive rhetoric. The authors do not advocate for the elimination of persuasive rhetoric; in fact, they “believe that persuasion is often necessary,” but there are also “instances when changing and controlling others is not the rhetor’s goal” (5). Perhaps “changing and controlling” is Governor Jindal’s goal; however, this goal seems antithetical to his rhetoric, which leads the reader to believe his goal is in fact to stop the federal government from controlling the parents of Louisiana’s students. Jindal’s focus on the Department of Education’s perceived attempt to impose a “national curriculum” and his attempt to separate the interest of parents from that of the president and the federal government are telling moves identifying Jindal as a neoliberal.

Neoliberalism is the dominant ideology influencing the political decisions made by policy makers both conservative and progressive. I borrow a definition from Luke Winslow, who examines what he calls a paradox between the way higher education is valued in public rhetoric and the economic support higher education receives from policy makers:

“Broadly, neoliberalism is an economic, social, and political strand of capitalism characterized by a pro-business, limited government ideology. It has enormous influence in both the Republican and Democratic parties by establishing the largely unnoticed parameters upon which political decisions can be made” (204-05).

Often, the rhetoric of neoliberalism that permeates US politics conflicts with the reality our system’s policies construct. Neoliberalism, as an ideology, promotes individualism through branding and dividing people into categories, plus limited government involvement through demonizing and denying people access to social programs. In other words, neoliberalism champions the individual and taking personal responsibility while condemning community and receiving social support.

The rhetoric Governor Jindal employs in his statement promotes individualism first by branding the federal government as coercive and second by dividing parents and local school districts from the federal government. His rhetoric further promotes limited government involvement by demonizing the CCSS and seeking to deny Louisiana school districts the support of the Department of Education. Both individuality and limited government contribute to the neoliberal cultural logic of personal responsibility. The cultural logic of personal responsibility claims that when individuals are made responsible for their own economic and social welfare, they have the agency to decide, and take control of, their lives. As Winslow argues, “When put into practice, neoliberalism is more specifically characterized by offloading, offshoring, free markets, flexible labor, and—important for the educational funding paradox—deep suspicion of social programs” (205). In short, neoliberalism urges individuals to reject social support in favor of doing things for themselves.

The cultural logic of personal responsibility is problematic. Personal responsibility
ignores issues such as sexism, racism, ability, access, etc. Most pertinent to Jindal’s statement is the issue of access. Jindal would rather the state of Louisiana regulate its educational system independently than provide the parents of Louisiana’s students with access to the support of the Department of Education. Throughout the statement, Jindal attempts to persuade parents to align with neoliberal cultural logics such as that of personal responsibility and the states’ right to govern themselves independent of the federal government. For example, he claims that the United States Constitution’s Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from “coercing states to adopt Common Core standards and assessments” (Jindal “Sues”). This argument subsumes two neoliberal State vs. Federal claims: first, the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government’s implementation of the CCSS; second, the federal government’s method of implementing the CCSS is coercive. Underlying these two summations are Jindal’s implication that the CCSS have been corrupted and are unsuitable for Louisiana’s students. Jindal’s implication that the CCSS have been corrupted, along with his other neoliberal claims, create what Kenneth Burke referred to as pieties. Piety, as Burke defined the term, is “what properly goes with what” (“Permanence” 100). The pieties created here are that the federal government goes with bullying; Governor Jindal goes with defending his state, its parents, and their children; and the CCSS go with coercion and incompetence.

The CCSS and the Tenth Amendment
Understanding what the CCSS are as well as how the Tenth Amendment has historically been enforced will help to provide context for Jindal’s lawsuit and subsequent statement. Educational standards are a list of abilities, typically in math, reading, and writing, that a student should be able to competently perform at a given grade level. The CCSS open with an introduction that lists the organizations that created the standards, e.g., the National Governors Association (NGA), and the “decades-long” process which culminated in the CCSS (Common Core 3). Following the introduction is a section listing those things not covered by the CCSS. The first point states that the CCSS “make reference to particular forms of content, including… Shakespeare,” but they do not “define… how teachers should teach” (Common Core 6). The flexibility such language provides has been the focus of educators like Katherine Grindon, a middle school Language Arts teacher who took part in a state-created network that was tasked with interpreting and implementing the CCSS. Grindon claims that “the new CCSS demand that students do more complex analysis than they have done before but do not offer direction on instruction itself” (253). Grindon carries this sentiment throughout her article—a year-long study of her own classroom, how she implemented the standards, and how they were received by her students.

Longtime education policy consultant and author of Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization Movement and the Danger to America’s Public Schools, Diane Ravitch, has recently formed a new opinion on education standards. Ravitch claims that “the overreliance on and misuse of testing and data have created a sense of crisis, lending
credibility to claims that American public education is failing and in decline” (6). In the 90s, Ravitch was an outspoken supporter of standards and felt strongly that the standards in American schools were lacking. As she worked to update and implement standards, she began to realize the complexity and unpredictability of education, testing, and accountability. Ravitch explains that “there are more remedial classes today, but there are also more public school students with special needs, more students who don’t read English, more students from troubled families, and fewer students dropping out” (32). This suggests that standardized testing cannot accurately capture the picture of the modern classroom, it cannot gauge the ability of a diverse classroom, and it should not be used to determine whether a school is above or below an idealistic mark. What Grindon found in the CCSS was a challenge, a helpful tool, and suggestions that she was able to apply to her unique group of students. Grindon, as an educator, sees in the CCSS the potential for positive growth that Ravitch likely sought when she began to advocate for higher standards. It is not necessarily the standards themselves that are a threat to public education, but as Ravitch points out, the “overreliance on and misuse of” the testing that accompanies the standards that stands to inaccurately assess schools and label them as failing because their students do not fit the mold of the ideal American child.

Grindon includes excerpts from the standards to show what was required of her and how she interpreted those requirements. The first writing standard for eighth grade students in English/Language Arts states students should be able to “Write arguments to support claims with clear reasons and relevant evidence. a. Introduce claim(s), acknowledge and distinguish the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and organize the reasons and evidence logically” (Common Core 42). Grindon perceives such a standard as a guideline that explains what a student should be able to do at a certain stage in their education (write arguments to support claims), but the standards do not tell teachers how to prepare their students to reach the standards (what arguments to use, and what counts as evidence). In other words, the CCSS do not dictate curriculum, they provide markers for student achievement while leaving pedagogical decisions up to teachers. The problem, as Ravitch discusses in her book, arises when these markers are used to compare schools with vastly different demographics. Whereas some schools may have students who are American born and have had a number of years to familiarize themselves with the processes outlined in the standards, other schools’ enrollments primarily consist of English Language Learners (ELL) and lower income students who may be new to, and struggle with, the standards. The fact that each school, and each child, is different does not suggest that there should be no standards for educators to strive towards, it simply means that testing for these standards in the same way across all school districts throughout the country is, at best, an inaccurate measurement of the American education system.

In 2008, Governor Jindal voluntarily entered the state of Louisiana into the Common Core standards through the Race to the Top program, claiming that outcome-based standards were necessary to ensure that students in Louisiana were prepared for the increasingly competitive global marketplace (Jindal “Encourages”).
In August of 2014, against the advice of Jindal’s Superintendent of Education, John White, and coincidently during a national midterm election, Jindal reversed his support for the CCSS, trying many judicial means to stop their implementation. One such means was an attempt by Governor Jindal’s administration to withhold funds for CCSS testing supplies. Subsequently, a Louisiana judge ruled that the governor and his administration could not block the CCSS by limiting the funding of CCSS testing supplies (Hernandez). Though the debate continues, as of the 2014–15 school year Louisiana was using the CCSS. In the statement analyzed below, Jindal makes no distinction between the standards and the testing, nor does he give specific reasons why he feels the CCSS are not right for the students in his state. What Jindal does is argue against the CCSS on the basis of the Tenth Amendment; he opposes the standards on the principle that they are against the constitution and largely ignores the content of the standards themselves.

The Tenth Amendment states that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Jim Carrigan and Jessica Bolger Lee sum up the Amendment: “obviously a power expressly delegated to Congress by the Constitution is not reserved to the states. On the other hand, as the Supreme Court has declared, ‘If a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress’” (51). Jindal claims that the Department of Education is using grant money through a program called Race to the Top to coerce states to adopt the CCSS, which is a federal set of standards; and, because the Constitution does not delegate the power to create and administer these standards to Congress, the federal government is violating the Tenth Amendment by trying to administer standardized tests. The problem with this argument is that the CCSS are a voluntary set of standards which any state can choose to adopt, and Louisiana happens to be one of 42 states that have voluntarily adopted the CCSS (Myth vs. Fact). Further dispelling the coercion argument, the Department of Education’s Race to the Top Fund, used by the state of Alaska, allows a state to create its own comparable standards and still receive the funding that would accompany the CCSS (United States, “Race”). The flexibility that allows states to create their own comparable standards negates the argument that states are being coerced into adopting the CCSS.

Pathetic Discourse, Emotions, Affect, and Their Affiliations

Criticism of the use of pathos in rhetoric such as that displayed by Governor Jindal is experiencing a renaissance in the rhetorical discipline. Recently the methodological use of emotion and affect has been advocated in analyses situated in both the public and academic domains (Condit, Fox, Lindquist). Celeste Condit argues, “the forces that Aristotle described under the heading of pathos are… influential in public discourse and its effects” (3). Her assertion is in response to ideological criticism, which she calls the dominant critical practice. Condit further asserts that emotion and affect have been largely ignored in rhetorical criticism because of the connotations pathos has acquired—connotations that dismiss pathos as a public display of emotion, which is assumed to have little to do with a rhetor’s
more effective ideological argument. In her article, “Pathos in Criticism: Edwin Black’s Communism-As-Cancer Metaphor,” Condit lists four relationships between emotional appeals and logical appeals: logical appeals dominate and dictate emotional appeals, emotional and logical appeals are separately derived but complementary, emotional and logical appeals are similarly derived but opposing, and emotional and logical appeals are similarly derived with logic being subsumed by emotion (5-6). Condit concedes that each of these may be the case in any given argument depending on the author’s purpose and the support used for the argument. Governor Jindal’s discourse follows the fourth relationship described by Condit, in which the emotional appeals supersede the strictly logical appeals. In Jindal’s case, the emotional appeals are so overbearing they create their own type of logic.

As well as listing these categories, Condit distinguishes between emotion and affect—emotions are socially influenced and consist of our internal agreements and cultural experiences while affect is the intensity, or bodily reaction, of the former (5). In The Affect Theory Reader, Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth offer a number of perspectives on affect, what it is, and how it functions. Intensity is one word they use to describe this difficult-to-define “force,” but affect is more than simply the intensity of emotion. Affect takes place in the body, it is influenced by our social experience, it is a force that influences thought and action, and it often arises from stimuli beyond our control. Emotion, though also complicated, is the more basic temporary response to an immediate stimulus, whereas affect is a deeper, more pervasive experience that is attached to, and adds to, our identities. I chose to focus on the affective forces at work in Jindal’s statement and how those forces might influence the identities of parents and voters. Emotion is still a helpful term, but it is unclear whether the force in the four relationships Condit discusses between emotion and logic is actually affect or emotion—the two are not mutually exclusive, and it is much easier to discuss emotion, the better understood of the two. What is clear from Condit’s analysis is that pathetic discourse has a direct effect on emotion and consequently, affect.

Through Condit’s reanalysis of Robert Welch’s Bluebook, we can see how an examination of the use of pathos can uncover the affiliations of a speaker. Welch, claims Condit, used emotionally charged rhetoric such as referring to Soviet Communists as “gangsters” who committed “mass murder” and “torture” to incite anger in his audience and unite them against Communism (14). When such language is used to define someone as an opponent of an audience, as Jindal’s discourse does when it describes the president’s administration as “coerc[ive]” and the audience is told that the opponent is “violat[ing]” something the audience holds dear, the natural emotional response, according to Condit, is anger directed at the opponent (14). By positioning himself as a defender of parents and students against the federal government, Governor Jindal is subtly affiliating parents with neoliberals like himself and pitting them against President Obama and those who seek government regulation. This act of affiliation suggests that the identity of parents and their investment in their children’s education is in line with Jindal’s neoliberal identity and the cultural logics of neoliberalism.
The Cultural Logics and Pieties of Identity
Krista Ratcliffe states that “Cultural Logics are belief systems or ways of reasoning that are shared within a culture” (10). Governor Jindal’s neoliberal belief system equals a distrust of the government that, in this case, gets expressed as derisive treatment of the president and the federal government. Neoliberalism then, is a part of Governor Jindal’s identity. In his article titled “Burying Neoliberalism,” economist Marcellus Andrews uses two widely accepted cultural logics to define Neoliberalism: in order to prosper, the US needs minimal federal regulation, and those forces outside of the federal government are inherently adept (59). Cultural logics like these, Ratcliffe further asserts, come out of historical moments but can be held and used by subsequent generations. She provides as an example the cultural logic of listening, which she says is culturally perceived as feminine in the US because women are historically perceived as passive (12). The cultural logics of neoliberalism were birthed during the depression of the 1930s and are being employed today in discourse such as Governor Jindal’s statement (Andrews 58). It is important to note that cultural logics create norms that not all, but most, in a given culture are assumed to carry out (Ratcliffe 12).

The norms created by cultural logics can also be understood as Burke’s pieties. In The Rhetoric of Pregnancy, Marika Seigel employs Burke’s notion of piety to analyze the pieties suggested by maternity books and manuals (25). Piety can be thought of as wearing the proper attire to a business casual event, crossing the street within a designated crossing area, or voting for a candidate or proposition that is in line with a prescribed ideology. Siegel gives the example of Pregnancy for Dummies, suggesting that a pregnant woman “troubleshoot her body by engaging with [the prenatal care] system” (Seigel 119). According to Pregnancy for Dummies, it is pious for women to receive prenatal care from a clinic or physician, and this piety stems from the cultural logic that doctors are the best form of care for pregnant women, ignoring the many women who deliver healthy babies through alternative systems of care like midwives and doulas. Similar to the foundation of Pregnancy for Dummies argument, Governor Jindal’s claim that the CCSS are unusable implies that it would be pious for parents to support his plan to discard them.

Pieties and the cultural logics that often birth them are closely associated with people’s identities, identities that we are often strongly invested in. For example, parents’ identities are associated with the cultural logics of education. Among these cultural logics are the logic of compulsory education, the logic of standardized testing, and the logic of a public education. A general coherence exists among most parents that these logics—i.e., all school-aged children must attend school; it is important to gauge the competence of schools, teachers, and children; and the federal government has made it a priority that all children receive an education—are necessarily a part of parents’ shared culture. With an understanding of these cultural logics, parents are routed into following certain pieties; but if piety is “what goes with what,” then children go with schools and schools go with educational outcomes, and since schools go with educational outcomes, and the federal government has made it a priority to educate every child, then it seems natural that the federal government would feel as though it goes with—that it has a responsibility for overseeing—educational outcomes.
Governor Jindal’s Pathetic Appeals

Governor Jindal’s discourse disrupts these cultural logics and their pieties and adheres to parents’ identities the neoliberal logics of federal incompetence and adept state government. The first line of the statement sets up two clear sides to be defined and discussed: “Today, Governor Bobby Jindal filed suit in federal court arguing President Obama’s US Department of Education has violated the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution and federal law by coercing states to adopt Common Core standards and assessments” (Jindal “Sues”). The two sides, Governor Jindal and states (and later parents) versus President Obama and the federal government, are at the core of neoliberal ideology and are the subject of the cultural logics used throughout the statement.

The use of “violated” and “coercing,” though not coming directly from Governor Jindal, are pivotal in the tone that is being set for the rest of the statement. Because the statement is announcing a lawsuit, the governor is expected to justify his intent to sue the president and the federal government. To do so, the cultural logic of the constitution is invoked, a logic that most Americans hold as integral to their national identity. Having “violated” the constitution, the federal government is depicted as abusive and malicious. Further, the government is said to be coercing states, a term which conjures a sense of governmental bullying. Simply put, the statement opens by constructing a formidable enemy—the US Department of Education and, by association, President Obama.

The opening emotional tone is affectively amplified by Governor Jindal’s initial quoted passage:

The federal government has hijacked and destroyed the Common Core initiative. Common Core is the latest effort by big government disciples to strip away state rights and put Washington, D.C. in control of everything. What started out as an innovative idea to create a set of base-line standards that could be ‘voluntarily’ used by the states has turned into a scheme by the federal government to nationalize curriculum. (Jindal “Sues”)

Through its pathetic discourse, the quote serves a number of purposes: it continues the logic of federal incompetence with “a scheme… to nationalize curriculum,” implying that a nationalized curriculum is necessarily undesirable; implies that states have what Burke referred to as an “inborn dignity” (“Rhetorical” 219) by referencing the “innovative idea” that was manifested by the NGA and state educators; creates a sense of entrapment with “strip away” and “control of everything,” alluding to the Tenth Amendment and the CCSS; and constructs a terrorist metaphor through “hijacked and destroyed.” The key to examining these purposes will be the emotionally charged words in Governor Jindal’s appeals.

Catherine Fox suggests that emotions have an important role to play in helping to express and constitute identities (11). Emotions, along with cognition, arguments, and actions, constitute people’s identities, such as class identity, so a researcher interested in how individuals identify with a social class might study emotional responses to the acceptance or rejection of a job application, the passage of welfare reform, or the emotionally charged rhetoric of a public official. Where Condit understood affect as the intensity of emotion, Fox expands on affect by defining it as the physical embodiment of our past experiences that are at odds with our present experiences and our future aspirations. An example of this is Governor Jindal’s past experience with the federal healthcare
program that he and his party did not support (the Affordable Care Act) and his emotional response to another perceived federal program that he initially endorsed (the CCSS) in the context of a national midterm election and the Governor’s prospective bid for the presidency.

Though the statement includes the president’s name only one time, in the first sentence, the inclusion is accompanied by an apostrophe, forcing ownership of the US Department of Education on President Obama along with all of the criticisms the statement has to offer the Department of Education. Hence, in every instance where the words US Department of Education or federal government are used, the president’s name, Barack Hussein Obama, could be inserted. To this end, the emotionally charged words “hijacked and destroyed” in reference to the “federal government” recall the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, commonly understood to have been carried out by people of Middle Eastern descent. Here the discourse implies a powerful metaphor—the president is a terrorist. Similar to the anti-communist rhetoric of Welch, this metaphor does not simply invoke fear in its audience, it inspires anger in those who harbor animosity towards the terrorists and, by association, the people from that region. Therefore, the metaphor does not foster “an understanding that engenders appreciation, value, and a sense of equality” (Foss and Griffin 5). Missing from the statement are attempts to understand the federal government’s intentions as anything other than coercive and inept. Also missing is any acknowledgment that Governor Jindal’s state might benefit from the aid of the federal government. Without these elements there is little hope that the two sides, states and the federal government, Governor Jindal and President Obama, might be viewed as equal, a quality essential to Foss and Griffin’s “invitational rhetoric.” Once Obama is clearly identified as the common enemy, it is impossible for invitational discourse to occur.

One reason for framing President Obama as the enemy and not inviting constructive discourse seems to be the opening this leaves for Governor Jindal’s discourse to unify parents against the federal government and the CCSS. The statement unifies parents against the president and the Department of Education with a single assertion: “these are big government elitists that believe they know better than parents and local school boards” (emphasis added). This is the crux of the statement, not that the CCSS are bad nor that the federal government is bad, but that parents are necessarily on the opposite side of the federal government. The emotional nature of this assertion places the identity of parents with Governor Jindal and neoliberalism and against “big government elitists.” Condit and Fox’s arguments on emotion and identity follow a similar argument posed by Julie Lindquist. Her article, “Class Affects, Classroom Affectations: Working through the Paradoxes of Strategic Empathy,” suggests that the way to uncover identity is through an observation of affective experiences and responses (188). Using the work of Douglas Foley, Lindquist agrees with Fox that class identity is a manifestation of the tension between a person’s historic identity (anthropological culture) and emergent identity (political culture) (192). In the context of the governor’s statement, parents are historically invested in their children’s education. The statement plays on this investment, projecting an emergent identity onto parents with two
pieties: President Obama and Democrats go with poor quality education, and parents and Republicans go with the superior state-governed education.

The tactics Jindal employs follow a pattern of division identified by Burke in his analysis of Adolph Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*. I feel I must be completely transparent in my use of Burke’s analysis; it is not my intent to insinuate that Governor Jindal is in any way similar to Hitler, nor that his ideology aligns with Hitler’s. I use Burke’s analysis because the pattern he identified in Hitler’s rhetoric is strikingly similar to the one I have identified in Jindal’s rhetoric. In “Rhetorical Analysis: The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’,” Burke notes that dismissing rhetoric like that of Jindal with a few strongly worded criticisms “contribut[es] more to our gratification than our enlightenment” (211). It is easier to condemn divisive rhetoric than to examine it for its effectiveness, but in condemning it we fail to understand not only how such rhetoric functions but also the ways in which it might be repeated. Burke warned of such a dismissal, common of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, which still retains a taboo or distractionary significance. Rhetoricians interested in language, communication, and influence ought to heed Burke’s warning and pay careful attention to the ways in which rhetors construct and circulate enemies.

In this vein, by identifying President Obama and his administration as an enemy, Jindal is able to say that anything the enemy does is by default harmful. By Jindal’s neoliberal dialectic, states have what Burke terms an “inborn dignity” (“Rhetorical” 219). That is, they are inherently better suited to govern their citizens, just as citizens are inherently better suited to regulate, and advocate for, themselves. Thanks to their “inborn dignity,” states should be allowed to create and implement their own standards of education (even if they have consistently ranked below the national average in school assessments for over a decade) (State Profiles). An effect of believing in this “inborn dignity” is Burke’s “projection device” (“Rhetorical” 219) wherein Jindal projects the failings of his education system onto the enemy he has constructed. Throwing off federal regulation, states can attain a “symbolic rebirth” (another Burkean term) by “protect[ing] local control of education” (Jindal “Sues”). Jindal’s rhetoric, similar to that of Hitler, sells the inborn dignity of local control while projecting the pathetic image of the 9/11 terror attacks on the administration of a president with a Middle Eastern name. He is selling this local control to the people of his state as well as the people of every state that has adopted, is considering adopting, or is contesting, the CCSS. The people can buy what Jindal is selling by supporting his lawsuit, voting for the members of Jindal’s party in the national midterm elections, and for Jindal himself as he pursued the presidency in 2015.

**Implications of Divisive, Persuasive Rhetoric vs. Invitational Rhetoric**

Governor Jindal’s use of pathos employs neoliberal cultural logics: personal responsibility, marketplace readiness and incorporation, the incompetence of the federal government, the importance of state independence, and the definition of liberals as elitist. Within this frame lie a number of neoliberal cultural logics of the federal government and states: that the federal government is out of touch with the needs and workings of state and local governments; the federal government seeks to control states; the Tenth Amendment
prohibits the federal government from implementing policies that should be left up to the states; and states are inherently adept, they know how to govern themselves, and they are best suited to make and implement policies that will directly affect them. Disregarding that the CCSS were originally developed by a collective of state educators, administrators and legislators, Jindal views them as federally derived and therefore incapable of addressing the educational needs of teachers and students in Louisiana or any other state, a sentiment that neoliberalism holds regarding nearly all federally derived policies (Andrews 59). Another cultural logic of neoliberalism—the federal government seeks to control states—is introduced in the statement’s opening with the use of “coercing states” and circulated throughout with language like “compel states,” “control of everything,” “control curriculum,” “coerced states,” and “herd states.”

While effects such as the 2014 US midterm elections (in which Republicans won control of both the House and the Senate) cannot be held as a direct cause of rhetoric like Jindal’s, which was common among Republicans during the majority of President Obama’s two terms (Boehner, Paul, Perry, Rubio), there does exist a correlational relationship between the two phenomenon. As Republican rhetoric painting President Obama as a common enemy increased, so did the number of Republican senators and representatives in Congress. This type of rhetoric, which divides its audience from an enemy and unifies them against that enemy, lacks an invitation to engage in the construction of solutions. By framing the subject of the rhetoric as an enemy, the solution naturally gravitates towards combating that enemy and consequently ignores those means that may allow the rhetor and audience to work in conjunction with the subject. Those means may involve describing the specific content of the CCSS, whether that content is something to be contested or modeled; discussing aspects of the alternate plan Jindal would propose; including testimony from teachers, principals, or even students that speak to a specific weakness of the CCSS; and asking the president and the Department of Education to consider an issue unique to Louisiana that the CCSS might not address.

The pattern of unification and vilification found in Jindal’s statement is widespread, and it can be found in many political speeches and statements from both Republicans and Democrats. Barry Brummett finds that Jimmy Carter used a similar pattern in two of his 1980 speeches to the American public (257-60). Carter, Brummett argues, used rhetoric that aligned the American people with his administration to show that a vote against Carter would be a vote against the people themselves. Also as part of his strategy to unify the people, Carter vilified the Republican Party and pitted himself and the American people against all Republicans. To accomplish this, Carter chided the people for their wasteful consumerism and urged an end to the increasing debt being incurred by “waste and extravagance” (258). Similar to Carter, Ronald Reagan employed rhetoric that aligned himself with the American people and, subsequently, against the Carter administration. Reagan, unlike Carter, did so not by blaming the people for their increased consumption but by praising their consumption and blaming the government for impeding their ability to be a productive nation of consumers (Brummett 263-64). Much like my analysis of Jindal, Brummett uses Burke’s analysis of Hitler to identify this pattern employed by both Carter and Reagan to create a scapegoat for the failings of the capitalist system that was in a recession at the
time of these speeches. The creation of an enemy on which the failings of a system can be projected, as identified by Burke and Brummett, was evident in 1930s Germany just as it was in 1980s America and continues to be in political rhetoric like that of Jindal’s 2014 statement.

Instead of offering solutions and inviting all parties to engage in discourse, Governor Jindal chooses to invoke fear and anger in his audience by portraying the federal government as a menace that has trapped audiences’ children and is attempting to control them, possibly to even ideologically take them away from their parents. This statement, however, is not an isolated example of Jindal’s rhetoric. Jindal is well known for his use of epideictic rhetoric, like his tweet responding to the president’s 2015 State of the Union Address: “I’ll save you 45 mins. Obama will decry Republicans, beat-up on private business and argue for more ‘free stuff’. Your [sic] welcome. #SOTU2015.” Online news sites often post articles that repeat and analyze Jindal’s statements. The site Salon, in an article titled “Bobby Jindal’s public humiliation: Why there’s a nasty side to his thirst for power,” highlights a number of Jindal’s emotionally charged statements, including, “I have nothing against anybody who wants to come here to be an American, but if people don’t want to come here to integrate and assimilate, what they’re really trying to do is set up their own culture, their communities, what they’re really trying to do is overturn our culture” (Isquith).

On another site, Slate, a search for Bobby Jindal reveals a number of analyses of his tweets and public statements like this one directed at the Secretary of State John Kerry: “Maybe Israel’s safer if he spends more time in Nantucket, windsurfing or riding a girl’s bike or whatever it is in Nantucket” (Weigel). Further emphasizing Jindal’s tendency to spark controversy is his response—found on Twitter but also on many other online news sites—to the Supreme Court’s decision to legalize same sex marriage: “Let’s just get rid of the court” (Howard).

All of these statements are important because strong affective responses to pathetic discourse can distract an audience from arguments lacking invitation as well as arguments that persuade an audience to align with an ideology. It is possible for discourse to intentionally lead an audience away from logic by arousing fear and anger within that audience. Invitational rhetoric, on the other hand, seeks to include rhetor, subject, and audience in a mutually beneficial conversation. Jindal’s statement, if it were sincere in its attempt to protect the children in the Louisiana school districts, would be best served by including all parties in the conversation. One approach Jindal might have taken would have been to list specific part(s) of the CCSS that are problematic for students in Louisiana and to call on parents to reach out to the Department of Education, asking them to alter those parts to accommodate Louisiana. Unfortunately, Jindal chose the opposite route; he chose to blame and to incite fear and hatred with his pathetic discourse through the use of his terrorist metaphor. We need to be diligent observers for such rhetoric because of its powerful potential to align audiences with a rhetor’s ideology. As rhetoricians and rhetors, we have countless rhetorical means available to us. Among them, we may align our audience with our ideologies while constructing an enemy for ourselves and our audience to combat, or we may invite the subject of our discourse and our audience into a conversation, seeking to identify all parties with one another equally.
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