Mary Ground rites combine Blackfeet, Catholic influences

By ERIK ZISSU

BROWNING — The wooden casket, covered with a Hudson Bay blanket, rested below the altar during a ceremony that twinned Mary Ground's Catholic upbringing and knowledge of traditional Blackfeet Indian culture.

At the stone Little Flower Catholic Church off Browning's main street, four tribal elders dressed in buckskin and headdresses joined the clergy dressed in white in remembering the 107-year-old Ground, who died last Wednesday.

In his eulogy, Earl Old Person, a former chief of the Blackfeet, said that Ground had always cherished her family. She made it a point to give every grandchild an Indian name, he said.

"As long as we knew she was living, that gave us strength," Old Person said. "Those things that she believed in will continue on" in her family.

He finished his eulogy with Ground's victory song and then was joined in by the other elders as he sang a song of honor for her.

Lined up with drums in hand, the buckskin-clad elders stood on one side of the narrow raised stage, separated from the Catholic priest near the altar by a life-size Jesus on the cross.

In the audience, squirming in the arms of their parents and wriggling off the hard-backed church pews, the youngest descendants of Ground were oblivious to the blanket-cloaked casket.

For the better part of the afternoon funeral service, a man seated near the rear of the church had alternately pleaded with and chided his young daughter and son to sit still and be quiet.

Now he turned to his seatmate and gently touched his daughter's straight black hair.

"This is the sixth generation of Mary Ground," he said, holding up the chin of the girl and looking into the wide brown eyes.

The children, he added, promise to increase the already large legacy of Ground.

Ground's family, which numbers 410 living descendants over six generations, fed the Browning community Sunday during a day of celebrations in her honor. The ceremonies culminated Monday with the formal funeral and burial.

Before the funeral, some 250 to 300 friends and relatives gathered at the Eagle shield Senior Citizens Center. There they filed past an open casket and mourned in groups or alone.

Inside the casket was a photograph of Ground, who was born in Alberta to family of Blackfeet Indians in the fall of what is believed to be...
Ground

Matriarch remembered

FROM IA

1882. She was given the Indian name of Grass Woman.

Sitting on a couch opposite from the casket was one of Mary Ground’s 11 daughters, Gertrude Heavy Runner. "There will never be another Mary Ground," she said. "Nobody could ever take her place."

Many people visited the Blackfeet Reservation and Browning, its largest town, to talk with her mother, Heavy Runner, 66, said, There were journalists, historians and anthropologists who sought information on the Blackfeet’s heritage from the woman who ‘acquaintances say possessed a versatile mind and a love of lore.

But no one could capture her wealth of experience and knowledge, Heavy Runner said. And now, she added, "it’s a great big book that’s come to close."

One of Mary Ground’s two sons, Eugene, said he was glad that his mother would not have to suffer any longer. The frailties of old age were painful, he said.

As he stood with his back to her casket, first crying and then laughing at his recollections of her, Eugene Ground, 63, said that his mother had spoken to him once about her fear for her family.

She worried that after she was gone the family would be scattered, he said. She had always told her descendants that they must stay together in order to endure.

When asked if this fear was warranted, Eugene Ground looked at those around him and told of how at least 50 grandchildren went to the hospital the day that Mary Ground died. The family will stay together, he said.

Following the funeral service, a lengthy line of cars and pickups trucks headed to the Browning Catholic Cemetery, where Mary Ground’s husband, John Ground, was buried in 1953.

On the fringes of the town, a group of about 100 people huddled in the biting north wind. Dogs howled in the near distance. Along the road near the cemetery, the line of vehicles sat idling, their exhausts sending out smoky tails.

As the last drops of freezing Holy Water were sprinkled on the casket, the crowd quickly dwindled.

Several family members watched as Mary Ground was lowered next to her husband and they added blankets and traditional bundles to the disappearing casket.

A combined Blackfeet and Catholic procession leads the casket of Mary Ground at funeral services in Browning on Monday.
Mary Ground's spirit lives on in her descendants

On Wednesday evening, February 7, a chapter in the history books of the Blackfeet Nation came to a close with the passing of Mary Ground.

The tribe's oldest matriarch passed away at about 8 p.m. at the Blackfeet Community Hospital, after living a life that saw her reach the age of 107.

Mary was buried this past Monday in traditional and Catholic ceremonies that took the better part of the afternoon at the Little Flower Church, and then proceeded to the Browning Catholic Cemetery, where she was laid to rest next to her husband John in a wooden casket that had been draped with a Hudson Bay blanket. John Ground died in 1953.

Before the funeral, some 300 people, friends and relatives, paid their respects as they filed past the open casket at the Eagle Shield Senior Citizens Center.

On Sunday, the huge Ground family, which numbers well over 400, held a celebration in her honor and had a feed for the community.

Mary, whose traditional name was "Grandma" and who was also known to everyone as "Grandma" was eulogized at the funeral by Earl Old Person. Old Person brought out the fact that Mary cherished her family, and that family strength was evident Monday, as a matter of fact, Mary's family it seems was perhaps bigger than even she realized. In looking at the feeling and reaction in this community, Grandma Ground, was a parental, traditional and national influence.

Mary and John would live on Cut Bank Creek until about 1950, when they moved into town. During Christmas time in 1952, John became ill and then died shortly thereafter of a cerebral hemorrhage in January of 1953.

During 1983 Mary would start to live in her Browning home that is located just west of the old Mission Temple. She lived there until entering the Blackfeet Nursing Home in 1983 at the age of 101.

During the period before entering the nursing home, Mary was quite independent. She would spend days at her own home, shopping her own wood, and doing chores around her place. In the evenings she would then go and stay with her children and eventually her grandchildren.

Throughout her life Mary was active in politics, and as she has told family members, was very excited when they found out that they would be able to vote. She was "very concerned that they would do it right, to the first time. John and I voted, we filled in every square with an X so we didn't miss anything or anyone." By the time the next election rolled around, they had figured out their mistake and an active love for politics was born.

Mary was always registering voters, she carried the forms with her most of the time. When it came to her own politics she was a staunch Republican, and at the same time had a great love for Democratic presidents. She always talked about Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. Mary also admired Richard Nixon. "After all they say they did not miss anything or anyone." By the time the next election rolled around, they had figured out their mistake and an active love for politics was born.
Mary in 1940

Mary was born near the Belly River, in what is now Alberta, Canada. Her birth year, 1882, was approximated from church records at the Holy Family Mission, and it is thought that in all probability, she was some years older than 107.

One of Mary's earliest memories seems to be when she was about 5 years old. She has told folks that she can recall coming across from Canada travelling on a train, and after coming to this area began living with the Sherman family. It was said to have been a busy time of travel with the Shermans as they spent a good deal of time moving from the Browning area to the Little Belt Mountains, they seemed to be on the move quite a lot.

When Mary was about 10 years old, she began to go to school at the Holy Family Mission. She was very good at reading, writing, and speaking English, and she became comfortable in their home.

"To know Grandma's life is to know her children and grandchildren. She is them and we are her. She has not left any of us - only shared herself in a thousand separate ways. When you go into the faces of all of us here today - her children, her grandchildren - there you will find Mary Ground."

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One of the things that Mary and John would do that they enjoyed was to move up to East Glacier in the summers where they would work for the Great Northern Railroad greets tourists and performing traditional dance. During those times, they were to meet many dignitaries and celebrities. People like President Taft and movie star Gary Cooper met with Louie B. Hill, the head of the Great Northern Railroad. "It seems like over the years whoever she came in contact with became her personal friend. Grandma had that ability to make people comfortable and at ease," said Mary Ellen LaFromboise.

Some of the many long-time friendships she shared with folks in Cut Bank included people like Walter Freed, John Moore, Julius Pfifer who leased her land and Wilbur Warner.

Friends were all over the country as Mary used to travel and love the St. Port Orchard, Washington. Washington was one of her favorite places to travel to as she would stay with her daughter Susie Owens. She made the trip every year from the 1950's to 1969.

The PowWow circuit was no stranger to Mary as she would be seen all over the Western United States and Canada at such events until way into her 90's. Mary would never stay in a motel, but instead would always set up camp. She was always prepared, and loved it as well.

Much has been written about Mary Ground, and her long life. Spanning six generations it attracted journalists, historians and anthropologists who wanted to record her stories and philosophy for posterity. But, instead of recording in some way, she chose to pass it on first hand through her family.

This brief and simple look at a very special woman is not intended to be a complete historical background, rather, an attempt to enlighten. To share some of the facts of her long and meaningful life. Some of the facts, such as Mary being an experienced midwife, and a keeper of the Medicine Pipe Bundle, that brought her and John to the forefront of cultural and traditional ceremonies, are not dealt with in depth. There are many other facets of this incredible lady that could also be brought to our attention. Perhaps that is work that is not of this day but of another.

"For now we will console her family, keep Mary in our hearts and thoughts, and wish her well on her journey in that next existence as she walks with her Creator and her God. "A woman who had the greatest gift of true spirituality, who was at home with her Indian prayers and with her rosary beads," Mary Ground 1882-1990.

Mary and John Ground - East Glacier Park - 1938

Mary in the 1960's
Historiographical Essay
American Environmental History:
The Development of a New Historical Field

Richard White

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Over the last hundred years some of the classic works in American history have dealt with the relationship between the natural environment and American society, but environmental history as a distinct field is a far more recent development. Early works on the environment clustered in western history. Frederick Jackson Turner in "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" and Walter Prescott Webb in The Great Plains made the physical environment central to their analyses. Later, James Malin rejected the often crude environmental determinism of Webb and Turner, and attempted instead to engage in an ecological analysis which stressed the complexity and interdependency of the relationship between human social institutions and nature. Malin is a likely founder of modern environmental history, but he himself disclaimed the description of his work as ecological history. After Malin, direct examination of the historical relationship between society and the natural environment languished. Western history itself declined in influence during the 1960s, and although younger scholars within the field continued to do significant work on environmental topics, western histo-
rians no longer dominated, let alone monopolized, historical thought on the environment.¹

The genesis of environmental history in the late 1960s arose out of political and intellectual history. The field took its shape largely from two works: Samuel Hays's *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* (1959) and Roderick Nash's *Wilderness and the American Mind* (1967). Both books grew rather logically from mainstream works in political and intellectual history, fields which in the 1950s and 1960s possessed an influence and vitality western history lacked. *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency* represented a reinterpretation of the Progressive movement then central in the works of Hays and other political historians. Hays was not interested in conservation for its own sake but rather as a revealing example of the "larger political structure of the Progressive era." Hays, however, by presenting conservation as the quintessential Progressive movement brought scholarly interpretations of conservationists into an entirely new focus. Conservationists were trained experts concerned with the efficient, scientific development of the country. Nature to them was a collection of resources to be rationally exploited.²

Similarly *Wilderness and the American Mind* did not represent a radical departure from existing work in intellectual history. In many ways it continued in a line of studies ranging from Henry Nash Smith's *Virgin Land* through Leo Marx's *The Machine in the Garden* which sought to use American conceptions of nature to interpret American culture or character. What set the book apart was Nash's concern with wilderness rather than with the rural, pastoral landscape and the attention he paid to those who saw positive value in wilderness and sought to preserve it. Wilderness for Nash, like conservation for Hays, was, however, the means to a larger end. Nash's goal was to reveal that elusive entity, the American mind.³

What made these two books more than simply major works in existing fields was the contemporaneous rise of the environmental movement. Environmental problems achieved a new urgency in the 1960s and 1970s, and environmentalists reached a political prominence that could not be ignored. Roderick Nash in particular recognized the significance of these developments. He called for the teaching of environmental history and has continued to update his book to include contemporary thinking about wilderness. Through Nash, and those authors who followed his lead, environmental history as a self-proclaimed new field emerged on the academic scene deeply involved with, if not married to, modern environmentalism.⁴

Environmental history thus initially represented largely the political and intellectual development of the environmental movement and

¹This essay will largely consider works published after 1972. For earlier works on conservation, see Lawrence Rakestaw, "Conservation History: An Assessment," *Pacific Historical Review* 46 (1977): 271–288. I make no claims to comprehensive coverage of the books which might fall within the definition of environmental history. In particular, numerous studies of government agencies, private corporations, and conservation organizations are not included here. For an excellent bibliography of conservation history, see Ronald J. Fahl, *North American Forest and Conservation History: A Bibliography* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Press, 1976). Also very useful is the excellent recent encyclopedia issued by the Forest History Society: Richard C. Davis, ed., *Encyclopedia of American Forestry and Conservation History* (2 vols., New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983). I have also for lack of space, neglected much of the journal literature. Three journals in particular publish articles in environmental history: *Journal of Forest History, Environmental Review*, and the *Pacific Historical Review*. Finally, the recent works of the most eclectic and imaginative of environmental scholars, Paul Shepard, simply proved unclassifiable.


its predecessor, the conservation movement. This meant that at its inception the field lost a certain breadth. The older concerns of historians like Malin with the reciprocal influences of environmental and social change temporarily disappeared, or rather became the exclusive possession of historical geographers. Historians now defined environment almost exclusively in terms of wild or at least unsettled land. Urban, even rural, regions moved beyond the pale. The results of conservation policy were neglected as the thoughts and intentions of conservationists, especially the federal conservation bureaucracy, were emphasized. Scholars studied not the consequences of the alteration of nature for human society, but rather what those who admired (or hated) wild nature thought about it. Nature itself became merely a background to these histories. 5

Within these narrowed boundaries Hays and Nash bequeathed what seemed at the time to be a clear and coherent focus for the new field. Interpretations of the conservation movement took shape largely within the framework of Hays's utilitarian conservationists and Nash's preservationists. On the utilitarian side of the dichotomy, however, the focus quickly blurred as historians accepted and praised Hays, but made little real use of his work. Except for complaints that Hays underestimated preservationist sentiments, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency was rarely directly challenged; instead attention was diverted away from Hays's bureaucratic and managerial emphasis back to an older concern with political battles and controversies. Elmo Richardson, who had concentrated on such issues in his early work, continued to emphasize it in his study of the Harry Truman-Dwight Eisenhower period. This political, confrontational emphasis occurred, too, in local studies of conservation and in reexaminations of the Gifford Pinchot-Richard Ballinger controversy. 6

Administrative studies of government and professional organizations took a less political approach, but here, too, the focus blurred. Even the most solid work, such as Harold Steen's study of the U.S. Forest Service, looked inward. It traced personnel changes and policy shifts; the relationship to larger changes in the society that Hays had emphasized largely slipped away. In lesser works these administrative histories became totally concerned with the internal affairs of the organizations. 7

Taken together, these studies did succeed in building up a substantial store of information on the sources of political opposition to conservation and on the policy and personnel of organizations concerned with conservation, but they lacked any clear interpretive synthesis. Hays, whose work was so instrumental in reinterpretations of American political history, was in danger of having the implications of his work for environmental history ignored even as it was praised.

A recent revival of what might be called the political economy of conservation has altered this. Several environmental historians have removed Hays's interpretation from its pedestal and put it back to work. Spearheading this new concern with utilitarian conservationists has been William Robbins's study of the lumber industry and the separate books of Abraham Hoffman and William Kahrl on the Los Angeles-Owens Valley water controversy. Hays had emphasized not only the commitment to plan-

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5 For the neglect of urban environments and concerns in environmental literature, see Martin V. Melosi, "Urban Pollution: Historical Perspective Needed," Environmental History, III (1979), 57–56.

ning, efficiency, and expertise that conservationists shared with the emerging corporate leadership, but also their mutual desire for predictable and orderly economic development. How this worked out in practice is the underlying theme of Robbins, Kahrl, and Hoffman.

Robbins, emphasizing that “the conservation movement was not removed from the realities of the political economy,” presents a detailed account of attempts by early twentieth-century lumbermen to use conservation to create a stable and orderly market by eliminating competition. They sought a rationalized industry. Robbins recognizes that their version of conservation in the industry’s interest was in competition, particularly during the New Deal, with a socially progressive version of conservation in the public interest, and his account of the struggle is sophisticated interpretative history.

That the public interest of socially progressive conservation was hardly an unambiguous concept is one of the lessons of both Hoffman’s and Kahrl’s studies of Los Angeles water development. The struggle of Los Angeles to obtain water has often been cast as a morality play in which the city’s insatiable thirst for water could, as in the movie Chinatown, symbolize more depraved tastes. Hoffman and Kahrl share with the industry’s interest was in competition, particularly during the New Deal, with a socially progressive version of conservation in the public interest, and his account of the struggle is sophisticated interpretative history.

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landscares is, for example, really a linear descendant of the work of Leo Marx and other intellectual and literary historians of the previous generation. Novak devotes more attention to European influences than did earlier studies, and this gives her work a comparative breadth that theirs sometimes lacked, but otherwise her concerns are very much those of her predecessors. Raymond J. O'Brien, in his American Sublime: Landscape and Scenery of the Lower Hudson Valley, has tried to move such landscape studies outside the parameters of art history and connect perception with actual changes in the land in a specific area. He meets with only mixed success.12

Wilderness has become the highway to the American psyche most favored by intellectual historians. Whether hated and feared, loved, or, best of all, beheld with a tortured ambivalence, wilderness has become the mythic core of the American experience. According to Richard Slotkin, colonists struggled to articulate their changing relationship to wilderness and, in the process, developed a self-conscious literature. Slotkin and others eagerly followed Nash into these literary remains. While some historians have verified a hatred and fear of wilderness, others have found in western travelers or in urban dwellers a belated attraction to the wilderness that the nation was destroying.13

Just as wilderness replaced the garden so too have preservationists replaced conservationists as the favored subject of biographers. Gifford Pinchot has yielded to John Muir as the biographical subject of choice with two new studies of Muir published within the last few years: Stephen Fox's John Muir and His Legacy and Michael Cohen's The Pathless Way. Pinchot survives among the heavily preservationist roster of Peter Wild's Pioneer Conservationists of Western America, but Wild felt compelled to apologize for some of Pinchot's utilitarian ideas. Other preservationists from Henry David Thoreau through Ernest Thompson Seton to Aldo Leopold have been the subject of recent studies.14

Many of these works—both biographies and larger intellectual histories—are insightful analyses of particular reactions to nature, but their larger claims of significance provoke some skepticism. As in so much intellectual history, they often preserve an entity—whether an American mind or national character—which does not demonstrably exist, and even if it does, there is no guarantee that the sources under consideration reveal its content.

In some of these studies, however, the problems run far deeper than this. Because of the authors' strong environmentalist sympathies, many of these books are more deeply felt than most conventional academic works. Although this identification with their subjects gives the books real power, it also presents significant pitfalls. There is in some of these newer works an impatience with the bounds history itself imposes. The past may be another country, but for some authors a transcendent nature can wash away the boundaries that time creates. Instead of a search for historical context, there is an attempt to find a universal language shared by author and subject. Michael Cohen's Pathless Way,
for instance, is a book that at its best offers an original and insightful reading of Muir; but Cohen seems determined to sustain a dialogue, sometimes literally so, with his subject. John Muir
The result is at times an almost mystical history where the shared reactions of author and subject to a particular place or to a transcendent nature eliminate the distance between them and thus supposedly allow a communication denied to others. Even more than Cohen's *Pathless Way*, Frederick Turner's *Beyond Geography* is an avowedly "spiritual history" of the "human spirit's dark necessity to realize itself through body and place." In different ways both these books are metaphories of actions taking place on a plane inaccessible to observers who have not had particular spiritual insights. Both are evocative of imaginative literature. Turner quite freely admits the parallels with William Carlos Williams's *In the American Grain*. Cohen's book brings to mind Ivan Doig's recent *Winter Brothers*. In the end both books, despite their unorthodox approach, are really not so much innovative as the oldest kind of history: nature becomes a spiritual force, permanent throughout the ages. Through it history derives meaning. In such history the past, however, is not so much made comprehensible as falsified and reduced to a series of costumes which people with our purposes, our concerns, and our experience can parade to the historian's drumbeat.15

For all their imaginative virtues books like Turner's and Cohen neglect the more arduous task of recreating a cultural world which reflects not our concerns, but the concerns of those who lived within it. This is an immensely difficult task, but one that must be undertaken. Nature is at once a physical setting where living beings exist in complex relationships with each other, and a human invention. Humans create a shifting set of cultural concepts about the physical world and identify these concepts as nature. When they act, humans do so on the basis of these cultural formulations, but their actions rebound on an actual physical world. Recreating these cultural formulations for any given period is the problem. Although they know better, historians often find it too easy and tempting to assume that the most articulate or those most clearly associated with later ideas are the most representative in their cultural attitudes. Other approaches to recreating culture are necessary. Historians might find the beginnings of such an approach in Yi-Fu Tuan's *Topophilia* which uses what might be called environmental ethnographies and where action within the environment is stressed as much as abstract thought about it.16

Thus far those works on the history of the idea about wilderness which have best succeeded in avoiding the problems of representativeness are those which have both narrowed their topics and placed their subjects within a context of actual experience in nature. Susan Flader's study of Aldo Leopold, for example, has been criticized as narrow, yet Flader achieves a large enough success within the limits that she sets. Flader examines how Leopold changed his own ideas about the predator relationships that he observed in nature. These changes were not simple and had as much to do with Leopold's experiences within the conservation bureaucracy and the political arena as with scientific reflection. In a less complex and more traditional way, Robert Sayre has examined Thoreau's changing thoughts about Indians and nature as he came to know both more intimately. John Wadland had done the same with Ernest Thompson Seton. Michael Cohen, in his more restrained moments, also does a fine job of connecting Muir's thought with actual experience in nature.17

In the same way that some biographers have avoided too cosmic a claim to significance by locating their subjects in particular environments instead of in nature in general, so too have another group of studies derived from Nash's emphasis on wilderness grounded themselves in particular places: the national parks. Because national parks are not just ideas but are places marked off and administered for certain purposes, the literature on


them can always be tested against some observable reality. The topic, too, is an important one. The existence of national parks—special preserved areas of relatively wild and pristine land—demands explanation. Historians, of course, hardly ignored the parks before Nash and the modern environmental movement; John Ise wrote a major monograph on national park policy and numerous studies of specific parks existed, but Nash's work certainly helped to reinvigorate such inquiries and give them new significance. Studies of particular parks continue to appear in abundance.18

The central question in studies of the parks has been how and why they were created and what they are for. The most influential and controversial work has been done by Alfred Runte, a student of Nash. Runte asserts that Congress in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries protected only "economically worthless" lands in the park system. It is this worthless land that has been the focus of attacks on his work which recently provoked a forum on the issue in the Journal of Forest History, the scholarly journal with the longest record of covering environmental issues. The criticism most often voiced boils down to the contention that the lands were not actually worthless and hence the worthless lands argument is a rhetorical ploy. Such criticism, while in one sense obviously true, in another misses the point of Runte's argument which is that the larger cultural context made it necessary for park advocates to deny the existence of any significant extractable material resources in the lands in question.19

Runte's explanation for early national parks does not necessarily apply to all parklands or to all periods. One of Runte's critics, Thomas Cox, has examined the genesis of a wider variety of parks and their shifting rationales in a series of articles over the last ten or so years. And Runte himself did not deny that modern environmental concerns altered the conception of the national parks; total preservation and ecological concerns, however, are "an afterthought of the twentieth century" and have repeatedly, if not consistently, yielded before older economic concerns. Two of the best studies of the development of specific national parks seem to sustain him here. Susan Schreper's The Fight to Save the Redwoods and Robert Righter's Crucible for Conservation both demonstrate the rise of ecological concerns (themselves not untempered by economic gain) and how pressures for development altered plans for ecologically coherent national parks. Kay Franklin and Norma Schaeffer detail a similar story in their Duel for the Dunes with its complex and compromised outcome.20

The framework used thus far for comprehending the field—studies of utilitarian conservationists and studies of wilderness and preservationists—certainly has merit for classifying many major works down to the present, but as a description of the reality of the conservation and environmental movements, it has grave weaknesses. Indeed, beginning in the early 1970s and building thereafter, the whole conservationist/preservationist di-

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chotomy has come under attack and begun to crumble. In 1975, Lawrence Rakestraw noted that on close examination of the early movement, it had often proved difficult to tell preservationists from conservationists. More recently, Susan Schreper also discovered that rational planners and romantic preservationists could be the same people operating in different contexts. On another front, John Reiger, while accepting Hays's description of the Progressive conservation, argues that Hays has missed the beginnings of the conservation movement in the concern of organized American sportsmen for wildlife. More than just dates were at issue here. Reiger anchored conservation in a nonutilitarian (these were sportsmen who disparaged hunters who killed food or money) concern for wildlife. If he sometimes exaggerated the ecological concerns of hunters, largely ignoring, for example, the war on predators, the basic point he makes is an important one. It is an implicit challenge to the prevailing dichotomy. Sportsmen do not really fit into either the preservationist or the utilitarian camp. As Reiger's examination of George Grinnell demonstrates, they shared primitivist assumptions with the preservationists, and utilitarian concerns of managing game resources with the conservationists. Sportsmen are also a very important pressure group. As recent scholarship reveals, they challenged those who claimed a property right in game and led the way for basic state and federal controls.21

The most telling blow to the preservationist/conservationist scheme, however, has been its inability to incorporate newer environmental concerns and scientific ecologists within its boundaries. Donald Fleming was one of the first to point out that the New Conservation Movement—environmentalism—certainly had roots in the older insights of Thoreau and Muir, but that many prominent figures in the movement—Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, Aldo Leopold, and Garrett Hardin—despite their often preservationist goals, differed from the older tradition in their desire to manage nature for appropriate ends and with appropriate technologies. This was a mark of the utilitarians. The appropriate ends and the appropriate technologies came from scientific ecology which was a science, as Fleming noted, in which none of the popular "ecologists" of environmentalism was trained. Samuel Hays has recently gone even further in distinguishing environmentalism and its concerns from the earlier preservationist and conservationist movements. He makes ecology only a single element in a wide array of differences which distinguishes environmentalism from its predecessors.22

Nonetheless, some scholars have tried to subsume Leopold, Commoner, and Carson under the old framework. They have found little conflict between their essential ideas and the romantic or religious insights of earlier preservationists. Recent students of John Muir have even carried this one step further by making the formulations of Aldo Leopold merely distant echoes of the spiritual insights of Muir. Stephen Fox, for example, stressed Leopold's ethical stance, even his mysticism, and made him a man of religious preservationist traditions. Similarly, Michael Cohen asserts that ecologists who recognize the "philosophical consequences" of their discipline will end up with a "philosophical, religious, and radical attitude toward human culture" similar to Muir's. What all this neglects is the managerial focus of ecology. Missing is the irony that Susan Flader points out in the career of someone like Leopold who was "making adjustments in order to restore a self-adjusting system so that adjustments would be unnecessary."23

Other scholars, recognizing the futility of fitting both scientific

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23 Fox, John Muir, 367; Cohen, Pathless Way, 151; Flader, Thinking Like a Mountain, 270.
and popular ecologists into the older classifications, have modified the framework itself. Joseph Petulla, who in an earlier textbook on environmental history (American Environmental History: The Exploitation and Conservation of Natural Resources (San Francisco: Boyd & Fraser Publishing Co., 1977) and Joseph M. Petulla, American Environmentalism: Values, Tactics, Priorities (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), has in his more recent American Environmentalism, acknowledged the separate influence of ecology in adopting a new tripartite division of the movement into biocentric (preservationist)/economic (conservationist)/ecological components. Petulla contends that it is people in his third category who have provided much of the intellectual basis for and leadership of current environmentalism.24

New classifications, however, do not address the more fundamental problem: Is scientific ecology really compatible with popular environmentalism? If scientific ecology were simply the land ethic of Aldo Leopold’s Sand County Almanac, then environmentalists and historians could both take comfort in the congruence between ethical and scientific formulations of environmental problems. It is, however, no such thing. Just as Flader has demonstrated the conflicts between Leopold the ethical philosopher and Leopold the environmental manager, so, too, there are contradictions between science and popular environmentalism.25

Suggestions as to how and why the two are at odds and why environmentalists have had difficulty in anchoring their ethical concerns in science are available in two very important recent books: Susan Schrepfer’s The Fight to Save the Redwoods and above all, in Donald Worster’s Nature’s Economy. A central concern of Schrepfer’s book is the shifting philosophical rationales of environmentalism. Schrepfer credits science with providing the intellectual underpinnings of militant environmentalism in the 1940s and 1950s. She sees environmentalists rejecting earlier preservationist rationales of a happy universe with a higher purpose. Instead, after World War II they supposedly came to terms with modern population genetics, natural selection, and a philosophical naturalism which discredited the idea of a higher force directing biological change. We were now on spaceship earth with no destination and no flight plan. Experience counseled not hope but pessimism. Such a perspective, by countering theories of directional evolution, enabled environmentalists effectively to challenge their opponents who held to the inevitability and beneficence of technological progress and human mastery of nature. There seemed no place in this new environmental position for the essentially happy universe of Muir and the discovery of religious meaning in nature.26

Well, not exactly. According to Schrepfer, once environmentalists had used science to attack the idea of universal progress and a nature rightly subordinated to the human race, they then turned on scientists themselves as arrogant, reductionist, and incapable of supplying necessary human goals. For such goals they turned to “pagan animism” and “arcadian pastoralism”; they rediscovered American Indians and returned to John Muir. Environmentalism thus passed through science back to an essentially religious position. This whole theme of nature and environmentalism as a source of civil religion is given a more continuous and less complex formulation in J. Ronald Engle’s study of the people involved in the long fight to preserve the Indiana Dunes, Sacred Sands.27

Even before Schrepfer wrote her study of the evolution of modern environmentalism, Donald Worster, who has probably been the most suggestive and influential of those environmental historians who have published in the wake of Hays and Nash, had broached the complexities of the relationship between science and environmentalism in his Nature’s Economy. Worster’s book approached the problem from the side of science. Using the conventions of intellectual history, he attempted to show how ecological thought reflected not just discoveries about nature but also...


25Aldo Leopold, Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (1948; New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Flader, Thinking Like a Mountain, 270.

26Schrepfer’s The Fight to Save the Redwoods concerns much more than the attempts to create parks in the redwood country. It is the best account so far of the emergence of militant environmental organizations. Donald E. Worster, Nature’s Economy: The Roots of Ecology (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1977).

the specific cultural conditions in which those discoveries arose. Where others had concentrated on literary, political, and popular thought about nature, Worster examined a very broadly defined scientific thought. He traced the course of a battle between what he called arcadian and imperialist tendencies within scientific studies of nature. The arcadians depicted nature as a symbiotic community; the imperialists praised human dominance. The battle shifted as much from changes in society as discoveries about nature itself. A so-called New Ecology "transformed nature into a reflection of the modern, corporate-industrial system," and has relegated the arcadian strain to popular environmentalism.28

What preoccupies the numerous scholars engaged in this dissection of environmentalism is the question of values. Not just what the actual values of the conservation or environmental movements are but what the ethical basis of the human relationship to nature should be. The answers have been diverse not only because the movement is complex, but also because historians concerned ascribe to two fundamentally different sets of goals and theories. While some historians (explicitly or implicitly) search the past for proper models of conduct, others insist that past views of nature hardly represent transcendent values, but instead are simply reflections of the larger social currents of the society that produced them. They cannot be transplanted.

The search for proper values sometimes manifests itself in the biographies of the various fountainheads of current environmentalism, but it has received perhaps its clearest formulation in the literature on American Indians and the environment. Amidst this large and still growing literature there is a segment which quite fortuitously presents Indians as ecologists, as models to be emulated. Wilbur Jacobs made early contributions to this literature. Two articles on Indians and the environment, but the most recent and well documented formulation of this position is J. Donald Hughes's American Indian Ecology. Hughes, of course, does not advocate a "return to Indian ways of life in their entirety" but rather change toward the Indian heritage of "harmony between human beings and the natural environment." The problem with such a position is that it at times comes perilously close to a noble savagism more concerned with a critique of American society than with any critical understanding of Indian people's conception of or influence on the environment. Calvin Martin, whose Keepers of the Game is a controversial attempt to explain overhunting by Indians in the fur trade as a cultural war on animals, has wisely insisted that Indian actions cannot be divorced from their own cultural context. Martin has argued that profound differences in cosmologies of Indians and twentieth-century white Americans prevent Native Americans from serving as practical ecological models. It is a point well taken and reinforced by what is probably the best study of Indians and the environment, one which puts beliefs and practice in their full cultural context: Adrian Tanner's study of the Mistassini Cree, Bringing Home Animals. One weakness of Martin's position, however, is that, while their utility as current models of environmental conduct might be limited, Indian peoples did, as George Cornell points out, influence early conservationists. Ernest Thompson Seton and George Grinnell knew many Indians and their cultures and did incorporate what they regarded as Indian practices into the early conservation movement.29

The other school of interpretation which contends that

thought about nature, whether literary, political, or scientific, merely reflects larger cultural currents faces weaknesses of its own. It is perhaps a more sophisticated view of the past, but it is one which does not promise to reveal much about the human relationship to the rest of nature. Nature and the environment ultimately form only a minor part in the analysis. They are mere mirrors reflecting the society which views nature, thinks about and adopts policies concerning it. Attitudes toward wilderness tell us about the American mind; the purpose of looking at conservation battles in Colorado is “to provide a look into the turn-of-the-century American mind.” Scientific ideas on ecology ... more closely interwoven with the general fabric of thought than is commonly supposed.” This is a relativist, historicist stance basic to the newer intellectual history, the merits of which are not the issue here. What is more germane is that physical nature in this literature becomes peculiarly passive and inanimate. The powerful mistress of the determinists disappears into a hall of mirrors where we see, not her, but rather changing reflections of our own cultural progress.30

Both of these approaches are ultimately unsatisfying because neither fully engages the complexity of history itself. The search for absolute values dead-ends because of its refusal to put environmental thought within a broader cultural context and its tendency to treat history as a sort of intellectual scavenger hunt from which one returns with useful ideas for our time. The historian's position is weak because in its attempt to understand the human relationship to the rest of nature, it only approaches one aspect of the relationship. It starts from the reasonable premise that individual thought is not independent but arises from a deeper cultural and social milieu and reflects that milieu. Thought about nature, in the end, only reflects other cultural values. The result, however, is often a cultural solipsism since humans never see nature; all they see is themselves. Nothing is really explained. Changed thought about nature is explained by referring to other larger, and usually unexplained, changes in society. Carried to an extreme, environmental history loses its subject since the environment and policies only reflect other aspects of the larger society. Ultimately environmental history as purely intellectual or political history must vanish back into the fields which gave it birth and on which it relies for explanations of its subject matter. Intellectual and political history may be environmental history's parents, but they are, by themselves, unable to nurture it.31

Environmental history has sustained itself by widening its concerns and reengaging its analysis with changes in the natural world. Donald Worster's Nature's Economy is a good example of how what initially seems a purely intellectual history expands to include a fuller array of subjects. Nature's Economy occupies itself with the results of human actions on the environment as well as human thought about it. Worster's discussion of grasslands ecology, for example, is placed firmly in the context of the disastrous dust storms of the 1930s. Nature was not just something being thought about; it was the sum of natural processes which altered and changed human lives. Ecology was, after all, not just a philosophical system; it was also an attempt to describe the workings of natural systems.32

Ronald Tobey has carried this approach even further in his recent Saving the Prairies, which concerns the same Clementian school of grasslands ecology with its theory of ecological succession leading to a nearly perfectly adapted climax formation. Ecology, Tobey insists, is not an aspect of romantic preservationism, but rather is “derived from utilitarian and scientific problems.” Tobey puts scientific ecology within both a social and natural framework. Like Nature’s Economy, this is still intellectual history, but Tobey's volume is of the newer chastened sort. Although both Tobey and Worster reject positivism and call on social explanations for the origin and evolution of grasslands ecology, Tobey operates on a more detailed and less cosmic plane than Worster. He stays away from the sweeping comparisons with Turnerian theory and the

30The reference to the American mind refers to Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind. The quotes, in order, are from McCarthy, Hour of Trial, 4, and Worster, Nature's Economy.

31Donald Worster is the historian who most frankly addresses the problem of trying to extract ethical standards from studies of nature. He does not deny the possibility. Although he hedges his suggestion with qualifications, he suggests in Nature's Economy that “scientist and moralist might together explore a potential union of their concerns; might seek a set of empirical facts with ethical meaning, a set of moral truths” (p. 338). See also Donald Worster, "History as Natural History: An Essay on Theory and Method,” Pacific Historical Review, LI (1984), 1–19.

sometimes merely metaphoric connections with social change that Worster employs. The connections Tobey advances are narrower, more demonstrable, and often quantifiable. Professional relationships, verifiable intellectual influences, and political loyalties explain the success of the theory while its fall results from the pummeling the Dust Bowl gave Clementian theory even while simultaneously opened up new opportunities for Clements and his students as managers of the grasslands.33

How fruitful such attempts to link up an understanding of scientific thinking, environmental change, and social change can be is demonstrated in a series of works on a relatively narrow topic: insecticides. Thomas Dunlap's DDT and John Perkins's Insects, Experts and the Insecticide Crisis examine changes in the natural world as well as the human thought and policies which helped produce them. In both works the reciprocal influences of environmental change, social change, and political action emerge. Perkins's account of the economic, cultural, social, and environmental influences which have determined why and how insecticides are used is particularly incisive. In combination with James Whorton's Before Silent Spring, a study which covers the pre-DDT era, these books have created a model of how the evolution of a particular environmental problem can be studied.34

The work of Perkins and Dunlap is an example of the reemergence of an older environmental history where the ecological and social consequences of human-induced changes in the natural world serve not as a background to a largely intellectual or political history, but rather are moved to the foreground as the substance of the history itself. This history owes much to James Malin, but his relationship to it is a complex one. Malin sometimes seems the Lazarus of American historians; for the last decade so many scholars have been trying to resurrect his scholarly reputation that it is perhaps time for someone to point out that the tomb is empty. Malin's reputation has long ago risen. Repe-


35The collection edited by Swierenga, History and Ecology contains a bibliography of Malin's work and a fine essay on his scholarship.
nfield's study of the Dust Bowl. Bonnfield reduces the Dust Bowl to a temporary technical maladjustment which was aggravated by a perverse weather cycle. He contends that the social consequences have been grossly exaggerated and that resolute farmers corrected the problems despite misguided government programs. Nevertheless, Malin still emerges well from any comparison to these later works on the grassland. He first framed the problem and recognized its significance. His analysis of the failings of the Dust Bowl marked the full reemergence of studies by historians who examined the relationship between social and environmental change. The long absence of historians from the field had left such concerns pretty firmly in the hands of historical geographers. From Carl Sauer through Andrew Hill Clark to Donald Meinig, the influence of humans on the landscape had remained a central concern of historical geography. These studies tended in the 1960s to be regional in focus. Clark produced his artful study of Nova Scotia while Meinig turned out sometimes massive tomes on the Pacific Northwest, Texas, and the Southwest. On the surface, Meinig's books might appear to be conventional regional histories, but beneath his sometimes numbing description lurked his major concern: the transformation of the land. He stressed the way in which humans have influenced "every foot of ground," and the cultural baggage which, for better or worse, had so often influenced land use.37

As historians rekindled their own interests, they and the historical geographers have turned out a new generation of local studies which draw on this scholarship even as they differ from it in significant ways. The newer studies are more concerned with the consequences of the environmental changes humans had wrought. The rationale behind many of these works seems to be that a small, relatively isolated region can provide an almost laboratory example of social and environmental change at work. My own Land Use, Environment, and Social Change studies a county in western Washington from Salish Indian occupation until the 1940s. William Preston's Vanishing Landscapes took basically the same approach to the Tulare Lake Basin in California. Roughly similar books have appeared on the Tahoe Lake Basin, early nineteenth-century New Brunswick, and the Sonoran desert. Unfortunately, few of these studies have been informed by the others.38

Other recent books have adopted a larger regional focus. Two of the most prominent of these are William Cronon's Changes in the Land and Albert Cowdrey's This Land, This South. Cronon's work is the most successful of the two because he limits his history to colonial New England, and focuses his comparison fairly precisely on the differing ways Indians and whites shaped the land and the consequences of their actions for each society. Cowdrey, on the other hand, takes in the entire South. Although he compiles an interesting series of descriptions and vignettes (instructive dramas he calls them at one point), the cumulative impact is merely that of a series of snapshots of the changing South jumbled by broadly sketched explanations of the change.39 Robin Doughty's Wildlife and Man in Texas is a more narrowly focused study which still suffers from problems similar to Cowdrey's. The

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often anecdotal evidence cannot always support the book’s conclusions. Other regions have been the subject of two collections of essays: the first, on the Great Plains, is a conscious attempt to take an ecosystem perspective, and the second covers the Great Lakes Forest. As is common in such collections, there is some trouble getting the essays to form a coherent whole, but Frederick Luebke’s excellent introductory essay for the Great Plains volume gives that book a unity it would otherwise lack.40

The problem facing scholars making either regional or local environmental studies is, as Graeme Wynn points out in his Tim ber Colony, that no matter how carefully bounded in place and time local studies are, they involve processes which originated and involved much larger areas and groups of people. History provides few laboratories. Increasing the scale only magnifies the problem. The region cannot explain its own development or account for the processes that affect it, as Cronon acknowledges, eventually putting his study in the context of a global economy.41

Again and again local and regional studies must resort to ex planations which transcend the immediate material under consideration. In much of the literature interpretations of human impact on the North American environment over the last five hundred years depend on two broadly simultaneous processes: the expansion of western Europeans with their plants, animals, and diseases to other portions of the globe and the rise of capitalism and with it a world economy. Environmental historians do not argue that before European contact the environment was beyond human manipulation; what they do argue is that once contact took place, the invasion of exotic microbes, plants, and animals, along with entanglement of native peoples in a developing world economy, came to have an increasingly important effect in shaping the North American landscape and its peoples. This is an approach I took in my recent study of the destruction of three Native American subsistence systems: The Roots of Dependency. Such assertions can, of course, lead to the same trap that confronts intellectual histories of environmental thought: if the use of the environment and changes in it simply reflects something else, then environmental history loses its subject. The newer histories avoid this dilemma by resorting to neither economic nor biological determinism but rather the reciprocal influences operating between human society and the natural world. The land often produced unforeseen consequences for the society that altered it.42

Alfred Crosby made perhaps the earliest and one of the clearest statements of the often unforeseen reciprocal influences operating between social and natural systems in his Columbian Exchange. Crosby effectively traced the environmental consequences of contact among Europeans, Africans, and the peoples of Indian America. Yet as important a synthesis of the environmental aspects of contact as Crosby’s book was, it remained, in some ways, too biological. The social and cultural context of contact was too sketchy. Biology sometimes seemed to determine history. Such an emphasis was certainly understandable given the nature of the material Crosby confronted: the dramatic depopulation of Indian America from European diseases to which Indian peoples had no resistance and the spread of previously localized plants and animals all over the world. Biology seemed the crucial fact of history, and a school of historical demographers, of whom Henry Dobyns is the most noted practitioner, has asserted this in terms far more forceful than Crosby’s. Although there is no denying this massive population decline, Dobyns’s in his recent Their Number Become Thinned pushes pre-Columbian populations to dubious heights. The new figures are based on shaky inferences from partial data. Dobyns makes the

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40Doughty, Wildlife and Man in Texas; Blouet and Luebke, eds., The Great Plains: Environment and Culture; Susan L. Flader, ed., The Great Lakes Forest: An Environmental and Social History (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). Also pertinent here is Peter O. Wacker, The Cultural Geography of Eighteenth Century New Jersey (Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1975). Other regional studies are content with chronologically describing the changes in the environment; they make little attempt to look at reciprocal influences. See Raymond Dasmann, California’s Changing Environment (San Francisco: Bodley Fraser, 1981).

41Wynn, Timber Colony, 10; Cronon, Changes in the Land, 160–170.

42The literature on Indian alteration and shaping of the landscape is considerable. For discussion of some of it, see White, “Native Americans and the Environment,” 181–182. See also Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawns, and Navahos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), for the problem of determinism and reciprocal influences, see Cronon, Changes in the Land, 9–15.
decline too uniform while he oversimplifies its causes. Crosby, meanwhile, has modified his own view in an extremely important but neglected article. He presents population decline as the result of a complex interplay of social and environmental factors. 43

Perhaps the best example of the ramifications of European migration on natural systems and the deep connections between cultural and natural change can be seen in Stephen Pyne's *Fire in America*. Pyne's book is in many ways flawed: repetitive, tendentious in some of the claims it makes for the influence of fire on the environment, and sometimes crude in its social analysis. It is also, however, sweeping, innovative, and, most of all, insistent on the complex interplay between natural and cultural forces. Pyne makes fire a cultural phenomenon. How fire behaves and what its consequences are depend not only on natural systems but also on cultural systems with their domesticated crops and animals, with the meaning they attach to fire, with their understanding of how fire behaves, and with their ability to set or control it. Pyne performs the impressive feat of giving what seems a constant natural phenomenon a history. The movement of peoples, the creation of landscapes, and changes in natural phenomena all are intertwined. 44

Pyne's success in demonstrating the cultural elements of natural processes is part of a wider trend in examining the creation of postcontact landscapes. Pyne took what might have been a simple resource study of forests or grasslands, where the only history would have been changing policies and attitudes toward natural systems, and reinterpreted his subject in much the same way as to make it a dynamic whole. In a quieter way the same kind of change is reflected in other resource studies. Studies of land policy, for example, have been a staple of the history of western America since the nineteenth century. Such works comprise a formidable literature: lucid, precise, and comprehensive. The environmental concerns of such works were, however, limited. William Wyant has attempted to remedy this in a recent popular book on public lands, *Westward in Eden*, by appending a series of current environmental concerns and developments onto the framework provided by the older studies, but the result is derivative and disappointing. 45

Far more successful have been studies that attempt to interpret the landscape created by human actions as cultural and social artifacts in and of themselves. Hildegard Binder Johnson's *Order Upon the Land* focuses on the results of the application of the rectangular survey on the upper Mississippi Valley. Although a purely cultural artifact—the rectangular survey—forms the focus of the book, the actual results in the landscape can only be understood by looking at the complex interplay between nature and culture. More ambitious is John Stilgoe's *Common Landscape of America*. Stilgoe, beginning his study with the European experience in creating landscapes, examines the economic, environmental, cultural, and social influences which created the common American landscapes before 1845. Although the book sometimes teeters toward antiquarianism and offers generalizations for which the factual basis is dubious, it does a good job of indicating how complex the factors were which led to the creation of specific landscapes and the depth of meaning these landscapes could have for their inhabitants. 46

Among the factors shaping Stilgoe's landscapes was the second large process at issue here: the expansion of capitalism and the world economy. Differentiating economic processes from the other ways in which Europeans with their biological and cultural


baggage shaped North America is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, and many historians seem reluctant to address economic issues directly. To do so invites charges of reductionism and economic determinism. Historians such as Worster and Cronon, who emphasize the impact either of capitalism or the world economy attempt to defuse such charges by insisting that capitalism itself must be understood not only as an economic system but also as a cultural system which posits basic relationships between human beings and nature. Their analyses, whatever their faults, are not examples of simple economic determinism.  

In much of the literature the issue of the relationship between economic organization and environmental change remains implicit. This is particularly true in the studies of water which form a thriving segment of current environmental history. In the western United States water rather than land has emerged as the critical resource in twentieth-century economic development, but where students of the environmental results of land policy had literature developed over nearly a century to draw upon, scholars studying water had to start almost from scratch. Much of the basic history of water policy in the American Southwest has been done by Norris Hundley, not only in his *Water and the West*, a study of the Colorado River Compact, but also in a series of recent articles on Indian water rights. A broader but less detailed survey of the development of western water law is available in Robert Dunbar's *Forging New Rights in Western Waters*. In both Hundley and Dunbar water rights are explained not as static legal doctrines but as evolving legal systems contrived out of experiment and compromise in order to further economic development.  

Behind these legal battles over water has been the question of economic allocation: who gets it, why, and for what? Since western water is a finite, often scarce, resource its use represents a zero sum game: those who secure it do so at the expense of other claimants. Not only that, but those who use the vast aquifers of the West do so only by threatening the eventual exhaustion of the aquifers themselves. Water development, therefore, involves combat between alternative users and uses, environmental alterations, social changes as water is removed from one region and brought to another, and the threat of eventual depletion as water is drawn from underground aquifers faster than it is replaced. In water development the connections between social and environmental change are thus particularly stark, and Donald Pisani, in his recent *From Family Farm to Agribusiness*, has done a fine job of tracing the hopes for and social implications of irrigation in California as it shifted from a means of transforming society into a bulwark of the agricultural establishment. His work joins the careful essays of Lawrence B. Lee as basic reading in the field.

It is only recently that the suggestion has been seriously made in the West that water is best left where it is both to preserve an existing ecosystem and to provide recreation. It is a view that has prevented the development of sections of some major western rivers although the battle that has received the most detailed attention is one that preservationists lost. Tim Palmer’s *Stanislaus: The Struggle for a River* is a journalistic account of the controversy over the eventual damming of the Stanislaus River. Often affectingly folksy and too detailed, the book is still a useful examination of the two positions and a good account of how grass-roots environmental campaigns are organized and mounted.

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Preservationist/development battles over water go back to Hetch Hetchy, but even older are the battles between different types of development. In a major study that looks to the east and a state which seemed plagued by too much rather than too little water, Nelson Blake has written a fine book on water management in Florida: Land into Water, Water into Land. Blake works simultaneously and instructively with three themes: how and why water was brought under human control and the results of this on Florida's environment; how development schemes reflect battles among various interest groups, and how such schemes fit into the larger economic and political evolution of Florida and the United States. Blake shows how a changing economic and political context has brought older engineering solutions into conflict with ecological concerns and how environmental mismanagement has transformed the problem from one of having too much water to worries about both water quality and quantity. Together with works on Los Angeles's quest for water discussed earlier, Blake's book presents an excellent example of the environmental ramifications of the endless search for economic growth.51

The specter often haunting this growth has been the fear of resource depletion, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the arid West's concern with water. The most immediate worry is with the exhaustion of aquifers in the Southwest and the Great Plains, particularly the massive Ogallala aquifer. As Donald Green explains in the best account of groundwater irrigation in a single region, Land of Underground Rain, there developed in the high plains of Texas a deep belief in technological solutions to problems of aridity. Yet, as the aquifers have declined, no new alternative has developed. Charles Bowden's Killing the Hidden Waters, which examines roughly the same region over a longer time span, compares Indian land use with this mining of the aquifers and predicts ultimate ecological and social disaster for the region. More sanguine, but still critical of current development are Kahrl, Water and Power, and Hoffman, Vision or Villainy.


Environmental history. None of these books, however, offers a convincing assessment of how and why this seeming case of environmental suicide might make sense to the participants within the larger context of capitalism.52

Fear of ultimate exhaustion is a less dramatic feature of studies of renewable resources such as timber or grass, but here, too, depletion has been a concern of historians. A recent collection, Global Deforestation and the Nineteenth-Century World Economy, attempts to put forest destruction in its economic context. The two articles on American forests, one by Thomas Cox on the Pacific Northwest and one by Michael Williams on Ohio, point up the complexity of this destruction. In Ohio, subsistence farmers were initially responsible for destroying the forests, while in the Pacific Northwest it was commercial loggers. William Voight's study of the public grasslands of the western United States is less theoretically sophisticated than other studies discussed thus far. It harkens in some ways back to the old Robber Baron literature, but it does do a good job of examining the damage to the western range and efforts by western stockowners to conduct a land grab after World War II.53

The rise of environmental regulations has in recent years provided a new context for the study of economic influences on the environment. How in fact these regulations have been enacted, and what their consequences have been has received the best historical treatment thus far in Richard H. K. Vietor's book on the coal industry: Environmental Politics and the Coal Coalition. Vietor explains how changing economic organization has contributed to the ability of coal producers and their allies to blunt the impact of environmental regulations which seek to force producers to assume more of the social costs of energy production. He argues that pluralist models hardly describe a process which, because it increasingly focuses on technical issues, fa-


vors corporate coalitions which possess the resources necessary to dominate in such a forum.54

In most of the literature discussed thus far urban environmental issues have received little attention, yet in many ways both modern environmentalism and the economic influences shaping the environment flow from urban sources. Although today the environmental and political problems of pollution and overconsumption dominate popular attention at least as much as concerns over wilderness or natural resource policy, these problems, as Martin Melosi has been pointing out for several years, have received little attention from historians. Melosi himself has done much to correct this situation both in his Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform, and the Environment, 1880–1980 and in a fine collection of essays that he has edited, Pollution and Reform in American Cities, 1870–1930. In Melosi’s work several themes already discussed come together in a new context which has the potential for significantly altering interpretations of environmentalism and its origins. Concern with health and the aesthetics of everyday life are a current of urban environmentalism which goes back to the late nineteenth century. Concerns with air, water, noise, and solid waste pollution form the basis of this environmentalism, and if efforts to solve such problems did not rock capitalism, they did raise serious questions about the actual benefits of the unrestrained free market. They brought into question the sanctity of private ownership and how social costs were allocated in the economy. They spurred the drive for public regulation. Managing the urban environment became a necessity and provided both an impetus for the rise of professional managers and an arena for conflicting pressure groups. Women played a particularly significant role in this since existing ideologies of domesticity legitimized their concern with urban environmental problems. Being “municipal housekeepers” seemed a logical extension of their existing cultural roles.55

As Melosi and several of the authors in his collection of essays make clear, the connection between pollution and health has been particularly central to the development of urban environmentalism. Originally founded on faulty science—the misiasma theory—the connection has nonetheless remained strong. Studies of public health have allowed a fruitful merger between the concerns of environmental historians and medical historians; indeed, the line between public health and environmental history can be so hazy that it is hard to know how to classify books such as Judith Leavitt’s excellent The Healthiest City. As Leavitt shows, initially many believed there was no necessary contradiction between urban concerns with public health and the desire for economic growth. Environmental reformers convincingly argued that there could be no real and lasting growth in cities like Milwaukee until the appalling death rates of nineteenth-century urban America were brought down and a decent environment guaranteed. Bringing it down, however, involved changes in the organization of the city and its economy. Reciprocal influences between the environment and society operated as fully in the city as elsewhere.56

The concern with the connections between health and pollution forms the starting point for a recent interpretation of modern environmentalism, Risk and Culture, by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky.57 The theme of their book is revealed in two questions: Why out of the whole array of dangers facing contemporary Americans, do they emphasize certain ones? Why do they choose environmental dangers, particularly dangers to health, when by most statistical measurements Americans are now healthier than they have ever been before? The choice of risk, the authors argue, is socially selected; it is a reflection of the society in which people make the choice, and more than that, people

54 Richard H. K. Vietor, Environmental Politics and the Coal Coalition (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1980).
56 Also, see Carolyn Merchant, ed., “Women and Environmental History,” a special issue of Environmental Review, VIII (1984), which points ou the paucity of research on the part
women have played in conservation organizations.
58 Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983).
who occupy different social positions within a society will choose
to emphasize different risks. The current emphasis on environ-
mental dangers is the result of the development of what they call
sectarianism. Sectarians are utopians committed to human
goodness, to equality, to purity of heart and mind. The dangers
to their ideal are worldliness and conspiracy, and sectarians
themselves tend to be intolerant and committed to drastic solu-
tions. The rise in influence of the sectarians is the result of a
complex historical pattern of social changes."

Environmentalism for Douglas and Wildavsky is a social mask.
Environmental problems are not the cause of the environmental
critique; they are an excuse for it. A cultural predisposition to
criticize and attack the social order comes first. Such an argu-
ment imposes some burdens on the authors. The reader needs
evidence of the existence and influence of this cultural predispo-
sition, and beyond that, an account of its origins. The authors
provide none of this. Their case for the environmentalists as sec-
tarians (a concept so flexible that it could fit almost any group
at some moment) is built on arbitrary and dubious cultural analo-
gies. The account of the cultural origins of environmentalism
is based on an historical analysis which is innocent not only of cur-
rent work in environmental history but also of recent work in
American history in general. The historical sections are, merci-
fully, as brief as they are bad. If this were done in the older his-
torical style of the social sciences, it would be understandable,
but history forms part of the underpinnings of the argument
here making the result silly and embarrassing.

In the end, Douglas and Wildavsky create a parody of the envi-
ronmental movement. At times they recognize its internal dis-
sions and diversity, but successes are attributed to their sectar-
ians. The evidence offered for this in the last chapters is quite selec-
tive and is presented without any attempt at historical context. 
There is little nuance here. David Brower of Friends of the Earth, for
example, becomes little more than a cardboard target lacking the
substance of depth achieved even in good journalism. Compared
to John McPhee's treatment of Brower in Conversations with the
Archdruid, Douglas and Wildavsky's book is a cartoon. Similarly
Joseph Sax's analysis of the same people who are Risk and Culture
sectarians has a subtlety missing here. This simplicity comes more
from a lack of research than from any desire to deceive. The long
and detailed literature on the growth and evolution of environ-
mentalism, on environmental regulation, on the integration of en-
vironmentalists into the bureaucracy as professionals, on the back-
ground of health concerns in urban environmentalism, is largely
ignored. Even on Douglas and Wildavsky's chosen grounds of risk
assessment, their own sanguine evaluations of actual danger are
vulnerable to the analysis of new technologies and risk assessment
that Charles Perrow makes in Normal Accidents. Historians have to
be aware of the strong cultural influences involved in assessments
of environmental risks, but determining such influences demands
a depth of research and an explanation of the complexity of histor-
ical change missing in Risk and Culture.58

Other social-science literature on the environment differs
markedly from Risk and Culture, but not always for the better.
Douglas and Wildavsky's emphasis on the primacy of culture,
oddly enough, is exceptional in the environmental research of an-
thropology. Until recently, most of this literature has reflected
either the sometimes bald functionalism of the cultural ecolog-
gists or a variety of cultural materialism. The first reduces hu-
man society to a series of just so stories—impossibly convoluted
and disguised adaptations to the land and climate. The second
offers a human history that often follows a simple formula of
overpopulation and consequent environmental deterioration,
which is arrested or overcome by a technological fix that allows
the whole process to begin again on a new level. Yet this literature
should not leave historians feeling smug. It has assets that much of
environmental history lacks. It asks basic questions; it shares
theoretical concerns that allow various studies to inform and
build on one another. Although often reductionist, it does at-
tempt to explain clearly and methodically the interconnections
between environment and culture. This literature often lacks his-
torical context, but not always. When historically informed and
free of its reductionist tendencies, anthropological scholars have

58 John McPhee, Encounters with the Archdruid (Narratives about a Conservationist and Three
of His Natural Enemies) (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1971). Also, see Sax, Moun-
tains Without Handrails; Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies
provided environmental histories as good or better than those that historians have produced. Seeds of Famine, a study of the roots of famine in West Africa's Sahel, is a book that can teach historians much about the writing of environmental history and the complex relations that must be considered.59

Environmental historians are now at a stage where they need to stand back and ask some basic questions about what they are doing. Recent work in the field, while renewing older concern with the connections between environmental and social change, has also dramatically altered the place of nature in such studies. The classic treatments of Turner or Webb were almost celebratory in their accounts of how nature had disciplined and shaped us; the newer history is often a dirge on what we have done to land and the price we have paid for it. Yet just as environmental determinism in the end collapsed into a series of unsubstantiated assertions about how landforms, soil, or climate had shaped human institutions, so may the new scholarship end up as mere series of undemonstrated claims about the relationship between society and the environment. Historians must find some way to fix with care and precision the causes and consequences of the changes that they study. Necessarily, this will mean interdisciplinary research. They must also attempt to determine the nature of cultural attitudes toward the environment in the past, how they evolved, and how they influenced action. They must not arbitrarily pick out representative thinkers to whom influences are assigned. Similarly, historians must fully explore the political, social, and economic contexts in which the environmental actions and policies that influenced the environment took shape. They must explain how priorities are set and whose interests they serve. Finally, before lamenting environmental deterioration, historians must offer some definition of what healthy ecosystems are and what constitutes their decline. Much of this is being done already, but it is being done unevenly and piecemeal.60

Environmental history is, for the moment, more than a fad. The concern with thought and policy that succeeded the collapse of environmental determinism is no longer as dominant as it once was. This initial emphasis was understandable and necessary, although perhaps excessive. If, after all, the environment did not shape human institutions, if instead, it was human culture and institutions which increasingly shaped the environment, then concern should center on human thought and human policies. The problem was that in such a formulation nature sometimes became little more than an intellectual construct. Nature does not dictate, but physical nature does, at any given time, set limits on what is humanly possible. Humans may think what they want; they cannot always do what they want, and not all they do turns out as planned. It is in the midst of this compromised and complex situation—the reciprocal influences of a changing nature and a changing society—that environmental history must find its home.


60For a recent evaluation of the field, see John Opie, "Environmental History: Pitfalls and Opportunities," Environmental Review, VII (1985), 8–16. See also Worster, "History as Natural History," 1–19.
3 October 1988

Dear Ivan,

Thank you for the nice words about the PNQ article. Yours is the first word of praise thus far, although I am heading for the Western History meeting next week where some of our fellow practitioners will likely have read it. Despite my grumbling about her "playing" with my style, Carol Zabilski does an excellent job of editing. One bit of amusement: Carol said I was mimicking your style with the use of the short declarative or interrogative expression! Actually, my use of that form is a subconscious (?) adoption of Bill Williams' style.

Glad to hear that the third of the trilogy is coming along well. I hope the eye problem is abating to allow you to work at your normal pace. Sometime before the year is out I hope to make a trip to Seattle for a quick look at a few collections in the UW library. If and when that comes about, perhaps we can have lunch together.

I am leaving here this weekend for Laramie enroute to the Western which is being held in Wichita this year. From Wichita I am driving south to Dallas to spend a month in the DeGolyer Library (at Southern Methodist University). The library awarded me a small fellowship for a month's work at their place. It is financially possible only because Karla's sister lives in Arlington. In any event, that trip will pretty much close out the primary research effort for the EMPIRE AND COLONY book.

The paper I am presenting in Wichita (Richard White and Dick Lowitt commentors!) is intended as a long introductory chapter for the book. Before leaving I will put a copy in the mail for you. Did I tell you that it is under contract with the University Press of Kansas?

Otherwise, all is well here. My oldest son is back in France for another year, armed with a degree in French from the UO. He is a delight, a blue-collar intellectual! His brother is getting heavily into history at Penn State while finishing up a degree in secondary education. Our children, Kelly and Aubrey, are 11 and 10 respectively, engaged in all kinds of sports and doing superbly in school. Karla continues to work at the OSU Federal Credit Union. If we can arrange a place for our children, she may fly to Texas and drive back to Oregon with me.
The attached item comes courtesy of my Luddite friend on the coast, Bill Williams. You of all people will be tickled to read this! Bill is working on a novel, and despite my suggestions about the ease of revising with a computer, he sticks to the pencil and canary pad!

The Coos Bay book should be out any day--at least Lita Tarver promised that it would be ready for the Western. Do you realize that I finished this book more than four years ago? Never again will I take anything to the UW Press.

Will you be at the Oregon Historical Society on December 4th for their annual author's party? I have been invited to be present for the Coos Bay book.

Enough for now; I will get in touch when I return from the land of "real" cowboys!

Warm regards,
Bill

P.S.: Ran a 40:30 10K here last weekend, my fastest time at that distance in 5 years!
AGAINST PCs


Like almost everybody else, I am hooked to the energy corporations, which I do not admire. I hope to become less hooked to them. In my work, I try to be as little hooked to them as possible. As a farmer, I do almost all of my work with horses. As a writer, I work with a pencil or a pen and a piece of paper.

My wife types my work on a Royal standard typewriter bought new in 1956, and as good now as it was then. As she types, she sees things that are wrong, and marks them with small checks in the margins. She is my best critic because she is the one most familiar with my habitual errors and weaknesses. She also understands, sometimes better than I do, what ought to be said. We have, I think, a literary cottage industry that works well and pleasantly. I do not see anything wrong with it.

A number of people, by now, have told me that I could greatly improve things by buying a computer. My answer is that I am not going to do it. I have several reasons, and they are good ones.

The first is the one I mentioned at the beginning. I would hate to think that my work as a writer could not be done without a direct dependence on strip-mined coal. How could I write conscientiously against the rape of nature if I were, in the act of writing, implicated in the rape? For the same reason, it matters to me that my writing is done in the daytime, without electric light.

I do not admire the computer manufacturers a great deal more than I admire the energy industries. I have seen their advertisements, attempting to seduce struggling or failing farmers into the belief that they can solve their problems by buying yet another piece of expensive equipment. I am familiar with their propaganda campaigns that have put computers into public schools that are in need of books. That computers are bringing us one step nearer to anything that does matter to me: peace, economic justice, ecological health, political honesty, family and community stability, good work.

What would a computer cost me? More money, for one thing, than I can afford, and more than I wish to pay to people whom I do not admire. But the cost would not be just monetary. It is well understood that technological innovation always requires the discarding of the "old model"—the "old model" in this case being not just our old Royal standard, but my wife, my critic, my closest reader, my fellow worker. Thus (and I think this is typical of present-day technological innovation), what would be superseded would be not only some thing, but some body. In order to be technologically up-to-date as a writer, I would have to sacrifice an association that I am dependent upon and that I treasure.

My final and perhaps my best reason for not owning a computer is that I do not wish to fool myself. I disbelieve, and therefore strongly resent, the assertion that I or anybody else could write better or more easily with a computer than with a pencil. I do not see why I should not be as scientific about this as the next fellow: When somebody has used a computer to write work that is demonstrably better than Dante's, and when this better is demonstrably attributable to the use of a computer, then I will speak of computers with a more respectful tone of voice, though I still will not buy one.

To make myself as plain as I can, I should give my standards for technological innovation in my own work. They are as follows:

1. The new tool should be cheaper than the one it replaces.
2. It should be as small in scale as the one it replaces.
3. It should do work that is clearly and demonstrably better than the one it replaces.
4. It should use less energy than the one it replaces.
5. If possible, it should use some form of solar energy, such as that of the body.
6. It should be repairable by a person of ordinary intelligence, provided that he or she has the necessary tools.
7. It should be purchasable and repairable as near to home as possible.
8. It should come from a small, privately owned shop or store that will take it back for maintenance and repair.
9. It should not replace or disrupt anything good that already exists, and this includes family and community relationships.
"The escape from history leads us to the world of myth."
Warren I. Susman

In his widely acclaimed essay, "The Idea of the West," Loren Baritz singled out the powerful influence on American scholarship of that extraordinary but mythical world that lay beyond the point where the sun crossed the horizon. That collective literary effort, suffused with the unilinear language of a progression to ever-higher stages of civilization, presents an appealing and attractive design for some, but for others it is fraught with historical error. In an affectionate farewell to his profession, William Appleman Williams thought the exceptionalist view was part of our difficulty as historians: "We seem to be driven by a kind of compulsion to prove professionally as well as politically and socially, that we have been right from beginning to end." More recently Edward Pessen provided additional words of caution: the task of the historian "is not to serve the state's interest in hearing its past behavior praised but to serve instead the larger community's interest in knowing truths."

Although scholars have questioned and challenged the exceptionalist (and mythical) version about America, the theme still holds great persuasive power. The consequence is a direct lineage to a body of literature that praises the virtues, the social values, and the accomplishments of those who came to
dominate the continent. From the Puritans through the writings of Charles Beard, David W. Noble argues, American historians have interpreted their culture as if it were "absolutely independent, standing apart in its uniqueness from the rest of the human experience."

But the exceptionalist version lives on, and it has especially set its fix on interpretations of the American West: in that view the West was opportunity, a lotus land and haven, a refuge for the discontented and outcast, a place of perpetual youth where life could begin over and over again. But in American mythology, above all, it was the "promise" of the West that loomed largest; for it was there that people would find the answer to their "yearnings and hope." Reality in that sense was less important than the symbols through which people perceived the grand design; indeed, symbol and myth passed for reality. For those who ply the field of western history, those mythical verities still hold great attraction.

To the degree that the West took on exceptionalist and mythical qualities, it marked a retreat from history, a focus on a narrow exclusiveness, a lack of an appropriate context with a wider world, an escape from the material base of things. That descriptive tendency, despite its obvious flaws, has from time to time exercised a commanding influence on scholarly work because it better fits the national mythology: it is a mood that is consistent with consensus interpretations and the periodic calls for new syntheses in historical writing. Works in the latter
category, Eric Monkkonen has warned, especially lend themselves to vacuous references to exceptionalism and the American character. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that we turn from the easy and comfortable designs of exceptionalism and success and look more closely at the structural role of capitalism in our common history.

The issue rests in part in an inability to grasp the full meaning of capitalism, the set of values and perceptions associated with that phenomenon, and its pervasive reach through American life, or what Donald Worster calls out "complex economic culture." Scholars have been slow to follow Fernand Braudel's suggestion that capitalism provides an identifying theme for studying "the basic problems and realities" of the modern world. It provides "structure," an organized way for examining relatively fixed relationships between "realities and social masses." Because charges of intellectual flaccidity have been particularly pointed in the field of western history, we need to be especially cognizant of the wide-ranging ramifications of political economy—the interrelationships between political and economic activity and the progressive alterations in those relations over time—in the larger arena of world affairs. The argument presented here is to suggest a search for more compelling arguments for historical analysis, ones that confront more directly the full meaning of capitalism, the agency that has so revolutionized our social order.

The failure to reckon with significant power and influence is
more widespread than we think. Even the innovative social and environmental histories of recent years, to varying degrees, evade central issues of power, politics, and the relationship of those elements to the larger social scheme. The "new" social history, Herbert Gutman charged early on, describes with some precision, but it fails "to explain" within the context of the broader workings of our cultural world. In a sense, history "from the bottom up" has significant limitations, especially when it is cast in a mold that ignores power.

Elizabeth Fox Genovese and Eugene Genovese have chided social historians for failing to acknowledge real power and for attempting "to deflect attention to the bedrooms, bathrooms, and kitchens of each one's favorite victim." While that glib assertion may be too all inclusive, if recent books and articles are any indication, there is abundant evidence that the issues of political economy often do not inform investigations of gender, of class and race relations, and of family life. Those works may not be in the "neo-antiquarian swamp" that the Genoveses claim, but they assuredly miss much of the essence of the material base of the historical process. That tendency towards depoliticizing is apparent in social histories of the American West as well. To the degree that politics and power does not inform our work, scholarship can more easily fall into the trap of the exceptionalist quagmire.

If, as Gene Gressley remarked at the 1987 meeting of the Western History Association, "our contemporary world requires
illusion," then scholarship on the American West is still doing its part to foster that public need. Or, at least in the sense that many of those who work in the field fail to confront essential questions of political economy and the basic organizing structures that move cultures to act as they do. There is a danger, I believe, that in our regional conferences and in the increasing volume of scholarly literature on the West that we could pass through this life largely unaware of the fundamental and transforming agency of capitalism.

Two sets of panel discussions at the 1987 meeting of the Western History Association provide a case in point. In one, "The Twentieth-Century West: A Retrospective Panel Discussion," there was virtually no mention of the broader themes associated with capitalism, although the panelists (Gene Gressley, Gerald Nash, Robert Hine, Patricia Limerick, and Howard Lamar) addressed problems of "insecurity" in the field, the search for synthesis, issues of federalism, the new social and intellectual methodologies, and continuity in western history. Howard Lamar disagreed that there was "gloom and failure" in the field and applauded the contributions of recent scholarship.

But in that wide-ranging discussion no one mentioned such fundamental and divisive issues as class, poverty, inequality, or the historically sharp differences between subregions of the West. Nor did the panelists reckon with Samuel Hays's admonition to the profession in the face of recent work in society and politics: "We will have to cope with persistent inequality as a central concept
around which American history is to be organized." While the field need not bedevil itself with gloom and doom scenarios, practitioners should be more cognizant of the excitement and challenge of seeking potentially more rewarding methodological venues.

A second panel on environmental history (William Cronon, Stephen Pyne, Susan Schrepfer, Richard White, and Donald Worster) raised probing questions about the West: as a place to study human interaction with the landscape; as a prototype for examining adaptation or non-adaptation; as an environment for looking at different modes of production; and as a forum for the study of federal influences, especially in land ownership. As the most "land centered" region, William Cronon suggested the need to look at the West as an aspect of an expanding European metropolitan community; rural change, he argued, is spurred from urban centers. Put simply, the pull of the market economy has far-reaching implications. Most of the panelists were in agreement with the claim that the major influence on the western environment was the capitalist revolution.

Hence, while there is promise here and there in the field, too many historians still avoid discussions about the hegemony of capitalism, a tendency that leans toward a conceptually directionless methodology. In his Bancroft Prize-winning book, *Dust Bowl*, Donald Worster warns that those who shun the word "may also ignore the fact," an all too common tendency in our historical literature. The words associated with capitalism, he
adds, offer clues to its wider meaning: "private property, business, laissez-faire, profit motive, the pursuit of self-interest, free enterprise, an open marketplace, the bourgeoisie." Robert Heilbroner once thought he could avoid the difficulties associated with the term capitalism, relegate it to the netherworld, and concentrate instead on the "particulars of the business system." More recently he realized that it was impossible to skirt the issue by resorting to "less contentious terms such as the business world or modern industrial society."

Following Heilbroner's suggestion would help guide us clear of charges of exceptionalism.

Begin with the work of Karl Marx whose historic achievement was to show the tremendous productive power generated by capitalism and how those forces revolutionized conditions of life, first in the industrial "core" nations, and then progressively around the globe. Turn next to an anti-Marxist, Peter Berger, whose recent book, The Capitalist Revolution, argues that capitalism "has radically changed every material, social, political, and cultural facet of the societies it has touched, and (my emphasis) it continues to do so." Understanding its cataclysmic and revolutionary impact, Berger cautions, "is a formidable . . . task." But one that is necessary if we are to move beyond the narrow intellectual design of much of western American history.

Because the modes of production associated with capitalism are perpetually in a state of flux, ever changing, and constantly
imposing new conditions on the societies they influence, that system has special meaning for the study of western North America.

The penetration of market forces in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the subjugation and colonization of native people between 1840 and 1890, and the progressive integration of the West into national and international exchange relationships provide the essential framework for broad historical analysis. Those forces, the prime movers in shaping (and reshaping) the emergent political economy, have not been of central concern to the academy, despite the proliferation in recent years of new methodologies and new dimensions to western history.\(^5\)

Both Frederick Jackson Turner and Walter Prescott Webb circumvented the issue through literary devices of their own making. Turner thought only "an understanding of the rise and progress of the forces which have made it what it is" could assist in comprehending the United States of his day. Although he mentioned that the transformation of the country was "long in preparation" and was "the result of world-wide forces of reorganization," he did not specifically associate that "transformation" as part of the evolution of modern capitalism. Alan Trachtenberg has argued that Turner's thesis was "as much an invention of cultural belief (my emphasis) as genuine historical fact. In a recent and provocative essay, William Cronon attributes part of the problem to Turner's poetic and "fuzzy" language that gave the "illusion of great analytic power" to otherwise broad and ill-defined terminology. In the end, and
Cronon emphasizes the point, Turner paid little attention to the eastern institutions that dominated life in the West, including the corporation.  

Webb's concept of the "Great Frontier" came much closer to identifying capitalism as the central issue in western development. A notion formulated late in his career, Webb's Great Frontier was the land beyond "the Metropolis" (western Europe) at the time of the Columbian voyage. The opening up of those distant places to European exploitation meant a series of "windfalls" that brought great riches to the metropolis. Webb's frontier was a literal Eden, a "vast body of wealth without proprietors," and it was closely associated with the development of an emergent world capitalism. Yet Webb failed to carry the argument further; instead he saw the Great Frontier in its epic "windfall" stage coming to an end by the mid-nineteenth century.  

In effect, those grand masters of western history did not pay sufficient attention to political economy. The dramatic alterations to the western American landscape of the 1800s—the human and cultural genocide waged against its indigenous population, the "repeopling" of the land beyond the Mississippi, and the persistently exploitative and turbulent nature of its many economies—did not end with the close of the century. And therein lies the problem: with the exception of some very recent and suggestive work, scholars have yet to forge an analytical tool, an overarching thesis—even competing ones—to explain the transformation of the American West from a region dominated by...
preindustrial societies to one that is a thoroughly integrated segment of a modern world capitalist system.

Changing power relationships and lines of dependency and authority have accompanied those revolutionary forces. As the United States slowly broke the British and European mercantile hold on the continent in the years after independence, centers of influence shifted from London and its metropolitan counterparts on the continent to newly emergent command posts on America’s Atlantic Coast. Those centers in turn spawned subsidiary trading liaisons in the interior as the market system worked its relentless way westward (albeit sometimes in great bounds) across the continent. New Orleans, St. Louis, and by the 1830s and 1840s, Chicago provided connective links between eastern metropolitan hubs and the great Indian trade that was rapidly entwining the native population and its subsistence base within the market system.20

Then came the gold rush phenomenon, an entrepreneur’s dream: for the shrewd, the tactful, the risk takers, and those with access to credit, the world lay before them. It brought capital, venture capital, from all corners and all at once. Many came, especially to San Francisco, the growing imperial center of an extended, sprawling financial web that touched the tiniest outpost on the Pacific slope. Still others ventured out to the periphery, to sources of raw material, or to establish subsidiary houses in the growing number of settlements that paid homage to San Francisco.
The gold rush underscores a remarkable feature of the revolutionary conditions that existed between 1825 and 1875, and one that historians sometimes overlook: the striking rapidity with which the transformation took place.21 By the time the first transcontinental railroad provided the symbolic commercial thread through the heart of the continent, the turbulent forces of an expanding capitalist economic system had wrought a vast continental empire whose productive capacity—for a time—would truly astonish the world. The construction of the remaining transcontinental lines, the settlement of the interior of the region, and the opening-up to commercial exploitation of its great mineral wealth were in effect "mopping-up" affairs in establishing the contours of that new, spacious, but still colonial West.

Until well into the twentieth century the colonial paradigm provided a convincing explanation for western development. Popularized especially in the writings of Bernard DeVoto and others in the years just before the Second World War,22 the region was described as little more than a geographical extension of eastern capital, a western outpost for Wall Street bankers to fleece. But that interpretation lost currency in the great boom period after 1945 when it became increasingly fashionable to see the West as a full and equal partner in the national political economy.23 Both paradigms, however—the older colonial model and the more recent liberated one—miss vital relationships, but especially the continuity of much of western history in the age of modern capitalism.24
Nearly twenty years ago Donald Meinig suggested that the West, or specifically the one that emerged in the 1870s and 1880s, possessed "a persisting basis of identity." Greatly influenced by the "revolutionary instrument" of the railroad, he argued that the growth of that West was exceedingly complex because of its heavy dependence on the federal government (especially during the wars of the twentieth century). Meinig believed it would be difficult to place the development of the West within the framework of standard historical explanations, because the financial hold of the East upon the region had taken on a different hue in recent times. In his view, an "insidious relentless imperialism" emanating outward from new centers of power in Texas and California had replaced the old imperial influence of the East. "Center" and "periphery," he thought, at least in the older colonial model, no longer provided adequate "characterizations for East and West."25

For their part, western historians have been slow to follow Meinig's suggestions; nor have many shown interest in dependency or world systems theory as a structural forum for studying the modern West.26 References to the theoretical work of Immanuel Wallerstein, Fernand Braudel, Leften Stavrianos, Andre Gorz, Samir Amin, and Andre Gunder Frank—if they are recognized at all—are customarily relegated to an obligatory footnote. This is not to suggest that scholars should adopt some of the more problematic directives of the dependency school; there is, however, an
abundance of suggestive ideas in world systems analysis and in other left critiques of capitalism, sufficient at least to provide a framework for examining the workings of that system in the American West. 27

Taking a broader perspective of the influence of capitalist structures on the region might also offer insights into the turbulent nature of the western economy. Success and failure in the American West, after all, were components of larger processes in the expansion and development of worldwide capitalism. Because its conquest and attachment to the United States coincided with the great period of industrialization, the trans-Mississippi West has been closely tied to volatile swings in the network of economic relationships that linked England, Europe, North America, and increasingly other parts of the globe in a world economy. 28 In a sense, the region is a prototype for modern capitalism with its uneven development, its far-flung extractive economies, its turbulent community histories, and its highly mobile population. Under the set of relationships that emerged, western America provided the vital ingredients for the industrial development of the United States (and of Europe): a rapidly expanding market; bountiful animal, mineral, timber, and other valuable resources; and finally—once the human geography of the region had been redesigned—vast spaces to attract a "new" population, one thoroughly steeped in the values of the market culture.29

The dependent character of the western American economy during its early period of development, especially its peripheral
relationship to centers of power and influence to the east—and across the Atlantic to financial brokers in London, Paris, and Berlin—placed the region in a particularly vulnerable position. For it was the underclass of residents in the West who suffered when the bubble burst, when the price of precious metal plummeted in eastern financial houses, when entrepreneurs in distant places decided to invest elsewhere. Indeed, if there is continuity to western history, it rests not in the realm of its exceptional qualities, its successes, but in the perpetually unstable nature of its material and economic base and the region's relations with the wider world. That is particularly true of the hinterland West—in Butte and Bisbee, in Pendleton and Prescott, and in Grays Harbor and Grand Junction—places where the system forced communities to move to the rythyms of its own requirements.

During the last one hundred years those conditions have brought sharp conjunctures to western populations: shifting modes of production; mercurial fluctuations in the prices of mineral resources and agricultural products; the introduction of new technologies; and uneven development within the region as new and influential concentrations of power emerged. Moreover, there is an "interconnectedness" to those crises, one that rested largely with the revolutionary and transforming agency of capitalism as it continually shaped and redirected the course of western development. At least until the Second World War there were few autonomous actors in the West; rather, most of the population in the region was linked to a system that perpetually forced people
to the edge of change: to shift occupations, to move toward the setting sun, or to fall into a lumpen underclass of wage laborers.

That turbulent world has always produced winners and losers. Raymond Williams put it nicely in his brilliant metaphorical reference to country and city, "changing historical realities, both in themselves and in their interrelations." What oil and mining companies do in our present age, he argued, is similar to what landlords did in bygone days. In that process the needs of locales and communities are often ruthlessly overridden.\(^{23}\) And so it is with the hinterland West where capital has migrated from one region to the next, from one sector to another in its never-ending quest for ever-higher profits. New modes of production—mechanization, new technologies, and the use of chemicals for a variety of purposes—invariably have benefited the few, not the many.

But the migration of capital within as well as beyond the borders of advanced industrial nations is not a new phenomenon. Although capital investment in the agricultural sector has disrupted rural life in virtually every region of the United States, it has had its greatest impact in the twentieth-century South at a point when the institutional obstacles to investment were removed. Those barriers, according to Douglas Dowd and Jonathan Wiener, included the heritage of slavery, especially an oppressive system of debt peonage.\(^{24}\)

During the 1930s and 1940s new circumstances, much of it related to the shock of the Great Depression and the Second World
War, transformed a low-wage, labor-based agricultural system into capital-intensive activities that involved base and extractive industries like textiles, steel, forest products, mining, and later electronics production. Those revolutionary changes in the rural South enriched the landowning class while it crippled tenants. Jack Temple Kirby has provided eloquent testimony to the human costs of those altered conditions: "The southern countryside was thus enclosed and depopulated as dramatically as was rural England toward the end of the eighteenth century." In that way, the South had completed a circle, Kirby concluded, "from undercapitalized colonial dependency to complex, well-capitalized colonial dependency." As 

Federal subsidies for irrigation development and heavy capital investment in western agricultural expansion, especially cotton production in California's Central Valley, contributed to the decline of the labor-intensive southern system. In the years following the Second World War implement dealers were selling record numbers of mechanical pickers, and California agriculture was well on its way to establishing itself as the prototype for new forms of productive relations in agriculture. External relationships were critical to that capital-intensive mode of production: marketing arrangements, credit houses, tax lawyers, and other institutional privileges available to the corporate few. As 

The division between development and underdevelopment,
between center and periphery, between the colonizer and the colonized, therefore, is complex and one that exists at several levels—national, regional, and within segments of the local population itself. Critical to understanding new bursts of economic growth is the evolving dialectic between changes in world capitalism and local economies. Hence, there are obvious social and regional contradictions in the development of the United States, conditions, Andre Gorz has argued, that resemble the relationship between an imperial center and a dominated periphery. The evolution of the American economy, he observed, proceeded from urban centers in the East: "Not until oil was discovered in Texas and sources of private accumulation were created by public finance (i.e. the creation of war industries in California) did other large industrial and financial centers emerge at the other end of the country." 

Yet the growing number of metropolitan centers in the twentieth-century West—Los Angeles, Denver, Seattle, Phoenix—did little to stabilize the region’s economy, despite claims to the contrary. In the land beyond those newly emergent metropoles, communities continued to sway to the tune of financial pipers in distant places. Mining, lumbering, and agriculture persisted as the most volatile sectors of economic life in the region. Dependent on perpetually depressed and distant markets, those industries provided little security or stability for the producing classes. In his classic study of the timber-dependent community of Everett, Washington, Norman Clark put the case clearly for the
resident work force: "[T]his was not and could not be a humane system." That assessment fits the turbulent employment conditions in the mining towns in the Intermountain region as well as the agricultural communities scattered throughout the West. In truth, the great hinterland expanses of the West remained as integral, albeit extractive, appendages of urban finance—even though as the century advanced the power brokers were sometimes closer at hand. In their provocative account of the "new" West, Empires in the Sun, Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb argue that the election of Ronald Reagan signified the "further integration of the new western power centers, especially California," into the national political economy. They conclude, however, that the old pattern of relationships has persisted: the riches gleaned through the exploitation of the natural wealth in the West, the profits garnered through the processing and manufacturing of its primary resources, continued to wend its way into the hands of corporate financiers. But those conditions are not unique to the West: in the Appalachian coal country more than two decades of federal assistance has done little to bring parity with more prosperous areas nearby. A recent study blamed "political and economic power configurations" and non-resident ownership for the region's problems.

The juxtaposition of both development and underdevelopment is a western and transnational problem. The role of modern capitalism in Mexico and Canada, immediate borderland neighbors to
the western states, has exhibited similar tendencies. Over the long course of economic development in British Columbia and Alberta, cycles of boom and bust in mining, lumbering, and in agriculture have been the standard, with much of that cyclical activity paralleling similar behavior south of the forty-ninth parallel. For their part, Canadian scholars have recognized the special character of the resource-based economy in the western provinces. Patricia Marchak has noted the congruence between private activity and public policy in the development of Canada's hinterland regions, especially in rail construction. By the late nineteenth century western Canada was exporting lumber, wheat, minerals, and other raw materials in exchange for American manufactured goods—the classic form of reciprocity, according to Marchak, between an industrial "centre" or "metropolitan" region and an exploited "periphery" or "hinterland region."  

In Green Gold: The Forest Industry in British Columbia, an exhaustive sociological and economic study of British Columbia's primary industry, Marchak argues that a "stable and self-sufficient economy cannot be created by exporting natural resources and importing finished products." For Canada's westernmost province, reliance on wood products has meant a relatively high standard of living in the years since 1945, chronically high unemployment in the interior, and an economy that has been excessively sensitive to market fluctuations. The province also faces a bleak future because its postwar prosperity has rested largely on the rapid liquidation of its forest
resources. Hence, from the turbulent story of its interior mining districts to the forest-dependent region to the west, British Columbia's economy continues to suffer through periods of chronic instability.

Nowhere did European and American capitalists achieve greater influence than in Mexico in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Under the dictatorial reign of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911), United States corporations began to dominate the Mexican economy through mining, railroad, and agricultural investments. But there was a peculiar twist to the modernizing that took place, especially in the agricultural and transport sectors: the export market was the focus of most of those structural alterations. Foreign capital dictated a narrow specialization in the production of particular export commodities. The consequent depletion of natural resources with most of the wealth winding up in the pockets of foreign investors, one scholar argues, has twisted the development of the Mexican economy.

The Porfirian achievement, then, included both a heavy concentration of landownership and foreign domination of the economy and public policy. Ultimately, the impact of international investment and exchange relations rent the national social fabric to the breaking point. The results were extended periods of turmoil (1910-20 and the 1930s) and the eventual emergence of a capitalist state of a special kind, one that remained, despite its populist protests to the contrary, heavily dependent on foreign capital. In his masterful study,
Revolutionary Mexico, John Mason Hart has placed that nation's revolution in a global context, one that embraces the influence of the recurring foreign economic and financial contractions that took place during the first decade of this century and that continue to plague the country to this day. Mexico's past, Hart concludes, is at one with the present: "The international financial structure has re-created the colonial outflow of material resources and profits, a condition that prevailed with silver in the Spanish era and during the Porfiriato."

Far to the west the Pacific islands of Hawaii, formally annexed to the United States in 1896, provide yet another excellent setting for the study of dependency theory. For the last 200 years, according to Noel Kent, the development of the islands has been peripheral to the expanding requirements of metropolitan centers. The series of transformations taking place on the islands, he argues, "received its impetus and direction" from changes occurring elsewhere. The post Second World War transition from sugar based economic activity to tourism did not alter basic relationships; indeed, if anything it intensified the degree of dependency on overseas capital.

There is a striking degree of continuity—a design of sorts—to the story of economic activity in western North America, but one that most scholars have been slow to recognize. For much of the history of the western reaches of the continent, the real and effective cutting edge of change was never the frontier, but
the great centers of financial and political power in London, Paris, Berlin, and subsequently in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and their financial satellites in the interior of the continent. Although those centers have become more dispersed in the twentieth century, they are no less influential—whether they function as agents of capital in Mexico City or in Vancouver or Victoria—in determining the viability of communities in the surrounding countryside. And they are all of a piece, linked in a variety of ways to each other through the complex interstices of modern capitalism.\textsuperscript{49} Hence, the rationale and the justification behind the historic movement of capital, I submit, will reveal more about the American West than idyllic notions about frontier exceptionalism or the habit in recent years of describing the region as a "pacesetter"\textsuperscript{50} for the modern age.

William Cronon raised the significant question in a recent essay: "why 'core' and 'peripheral' American regions have experienced such different developments." The various parts of the continent, he reflected, had developed as part of "a larger system of political and economic relationships . . . all within the framework of an expanding capitalist economy."\textsuperscript{51} It should be added that the major feature of the movement of capital in the American West and in its borderland countries, the point of origin notwithstanding, has been one of unequal exchange. Since the turn of the century, the metropolis has increasingly solidified its control over the hinterland, a development that has become particularly obvious in the years since the Second World War.
While certain sectors of the metropolitan economy have waxed fat on defense and silicon-related industrial activity, that prosperity has not been evenly shared, as any casual drive through the hinterland West (or urban centers, for that matter) will reveal. What has emerged, in the eyes of some observers, is a dual economy with a growing cultural and political division between rural and urban areas, a phenomenon especially noticeable in resource-dependent states. But even centers of power in southern California and in the Silicon Valley, despite their space-age, high-tech industries, harbor large work forces of unskilled, low income, and unorganized laborers. Is there a qualitative difference between the early and turbulent world of corporate exploitation in the extractive industries and present conditions in many parts of the West? To be sure, the ameliorative policies of welfare capitalism have muted the worst forms of suffering for the victims of the system. But capital has still retained its ability to shift from declining to rising sectors to meet the corporate need for profits. And for many western communities a new and even more threatening prospect looms on the horizon. The old extractive, primary-products economy, according to Peter Drucker, has come "uncoupled" from the rest of the industrial economy. Whereas the former sector was once central in the life of developed countries, it is now marginal. Those circumstances are certain to bode ill for the future of the hinterland West.

The daily newspapers continue to press upon us the most
recent crises in agriculture. Less noticeable but no less 
ominous, according to Michael Malone (and I think he is correct), 
are developments over the last decade in metal mining, once a 
staple of western industrial activity. "With what seems 
incredible abruptness," he points out, the early 1980s "have 
witnessed the utter devastation of the West’s oldest industry."
From western Montana through northern Idaho, Utah, Colorado, to 
Ajo, Arizona, energy conglomerates that had purchased the old 
metal mining firms during the 1970s began closing them down.
"Foreign competition," Malone argues, "has devastated western 
metal mining." The demise of mining, he suggests, "is part of a 
greater whole." It marks the progressive "integration of the 
western economy into the global economy." Malone’s assessment 
of the mining industry also fits the recent "restructuring" of the 
forest products sector as well as the perpetually changing world 
of agriculture.

So the contemporary West continues to be in flux; from the 
oil fields of Oklahoma to the wheat fields of Washington basic 
industry is languishing, victim to world economic changes. 
Michael Zielenziger, a journalist, has put the case succinctly:
"Lacking in diversity, dependent on foreign trade and natural 
resources, the West’s economy is unraveling." Current prospects, 
he observes, suggest the ushering in of a "dark, new West," one 
with islands of urban prosperity surrounded by an impoverished 
hinterland.
Now that time (and power) is shifting beyond Henry Luce's "American Century" to a point somewhere across the Pacific, it is incumbent that in our scholarly endeavors we pay greater attention to the fibrillations of the economic culture that has worked its will on our common history. Many years ago Lewis Mumford pointed to the unceasing ability of capitalism "to revolutionize the means of production," to promote population shifts, and to allow room for some to "take advantage of the speculative disorder." The stability achieved under those arrangements, according to Mumford, was akin to the "equilibrium of chaos." That description fits the pattern of uneven economic development described in this essay, a system that brought dramatic and persistently destabilizing influences to major sectors of western American life.

As an overarching theme for making sense of western history, capitalism has been the centerpiece for precious little scholarly work. That neglect is a measure of the way we have ignored primary and hegemonic features of our collective history. In an address to an audience of historians, Donald Meinig urged his listeners to free themselves from the "crippling insularity" of their field, "the overweening 'exceptionalism' of the American case, the rigidities of the assumption of the nation-state as the highest form in the political division of earth space." To question the idea of the exceptionalism of western development, therefore, is simply to recognize the revolutionary and transforming agency of capitalism as it has influenced life in the
region. "History," William Appleman Williams reminds us, "is dialogue, not consensus." To strive towards a better understanding of the West, both in its national and international contexts, we should indulge less in a quest for its uniqueness, but engage in a dialogue about the material structure of its history. That dialectic will lead us closer to the realities of the region.
NOTES


(January-February 1986), 45-96.


6. Donald Meinig charged recently that American history "has yet to be cast within the appropriate context" of a wider world. Antebellum scholarship suffers from its neglect of the Atlantic while postbellum accounts largely ignore the borderland nations of Mexico and Canada. See Meinig, "Continental America, 1800-1915," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians, Reno, Nevada, March 26, 1988, p. 17. Copy in the author's possession.

7. The current debate on the need (or, lack of) for new syntheses in historical writing is one manifestation of this tendency. Among the growing volume of comment on the issue, see especially Thomas Bender, "Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American History," Journal of American History 73


10. Elizabeth Fox Genovese and Eugene Genovese, Fruits of
Merchant Capital: Slav
Expansion of Capitalism

of Canada and Alaska (Albuquerque, 1985); and William de Buys, and Hard Times of a New Mexico University of New Mexico Press.

11. Gressley's remarks:
West: A Retrospective Panel Association, Twenty-Seventy-Seven, October 9, 1987.

12. "The Twentieth-Century Discussion;" and Samuel Recent Work in the History
History and Theory 26 (1987), 17. References to the "West" or to western history as a success story do not address the issue of productive relations in the West; it is more a social construct designed to suit a prevailing climate of perceived opinion.


19. Even in Borderlands history, David Weber notes that no "explanatory device has replaced Turner's thesis." Social scientists, on the other hand, have been attracted to Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory, "even if historians are embracing it timidly." See Weber, "Turner, the Boltonians, and the Borderlands," American Historical Review 91 (1986), 81n. For a few select samples that focus on California and the Southwest, see the special issue of Review 4 (Winter 1981).


26. William Cronon has cited the need to examine core and peripheral relations as a means to assess the differences in the "frontier experience." He also indicated that the parameters of a dynamic and expanding capitalist economy provided a necessary larger framework for assessing that difference and diversity. See Cronon, "Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier," 174-75.


28. One fundamental characteristic of capitalism, according to Wallerstein, is its ability to work its way beyond the will of nation-states: "The capitalist world-economy has, and has had
since its coming into existence, boundaries far larger than those of any political unit." See Wallerstein, The Politics of the World Economy, 13; and Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, 19.

29. According to Alan Trachtenberg, the West served both as "myth and economic entity"; it provided resources essential to economic development, and it proved "indispensible to the formation of a national society." See Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America, 17. The reference to redesigning human geography is paraphrased from Meinig, "Continental America," 7.


31. For select studies that address these issues, see Wallace Stegner and Page Stegner, "Rocky Mountain Country," Atlantic Monthly 241 (April 1978), 45-91; Worster, Rivers of Empire; Wiley and Gottlieb, Empires in the Sun; K. Ross Toole, The Rape of the Great Plains: Northwest America, Cattle and Coal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); John Young and Jan Newton, Capitalism and Human Obsolescence: Corporate Control versus Individual Survival in Rural America (Montclair, N.J.: Allenheld, Osmun, 1980); and Elvin Hatch, Biography of a Small Town (N.Y., 1979).

32. Stephen Cox has drawn attention to this fact: "The history [of the West] is the imposition of federal policy—federal lands policy, federal railroad policy, federal Air Force policy—and the
exploitation of natural resources by the use of capital from somewhere else, and the way those two forces combine, in real estate development, to produce huge cities with very sparse hinterlands." See Cox, "Talking, Reading, and Writing Western History," *Journal of the Southwest* 29 (Winter 1987), 377.


(Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1987).

36. Kirby, Rural Worlds Lost, 14-16; and Young and Newton, Capitalism and Human Obsolescence, 75. For comment on capitalist agriculture's impact on demographic patterns in Canada, see J. F. Conway, "The Decline of the Family Farm in Saskatchewan," Prairie Forum 9, no. 1 (1984), 101-17. Conway argues that the "heaviest cost of industrial modernization must be borne by the agricultural sector" (p. 102).


45. For an informed expression of alarm at the rapid rate of cutting in British Columbia forests, see F. L. C. Reed, "Reshaping Forest Policy in British Columbia," paper prepared for the Vancouver Institute Saturday Evening Lecture Series, February 16, 1985, copy in possession of the author.


50. For use of the term, see Nash, *American West in the Twentieth Century*, 294.


54. Peter F. Drucker, "The Changed World Economy," Foreign Affairs 64, no. 4 (Spring 1986), 768-70.


May 1, 1989

Mr. Ivan Doig
17021 Tenth Avenue N.W.
Seattle, Washington 98177

Dear Ivan:

During what passed for the last Legislative session here, the wife of a representative decided that her contribution would be the designation of an "official" nickname for Montana. It is difficult to believe that this is a priority item, given some of the session's other failures. However........... Her proposed nickname/slogan was "Montana: the Treasure and Pleasure State"--a line that evokes some interesting, if often conflicting, images. She was convinced that this slogan had been used in the deep, dark past, and she asked for a listing of state mottos/nicknames/slogans. Since we could not find such an animal, I ran a bunch of sources to see what the listing looked like. The conclusion is that no one but this woman had used the slogan in that form.

That leaves me with this otherwise useless list. So I started to think "Who likes this kind of junk?" and, of course, only one name came to mind. I don't know if you can use this material in any way, but it has the ring of "Montanan/Montanian," doesn't it?

Hope that you and Carol can make it over here for some extended time this summer. Looks like we have burned up what we needed to, and this summer will be less dramatic.

Sincerely yours,

Dave Walter, Reference
MONTANA: NICKNAMES/MOTTOS/SLOGANS/CATCH PHRASES

What follows here is a preliminary listing of sources that give Montana either a nickname or a slogan. Were one to do a really thorough job of tracking this topic, he should look at some or all of the following sources in addition: the publications from Montana's display entries in the various world's fairs; any number of private-sector publications that boost immigration to Montana and tourism in Montana (1880-present); any of the general-information series of books that list state symbols/flags/nicknames/etc., held in public libraries; stationary letterheads in archival collections; much of the literature published by local businessmen's groups, improvement/booster groups, and the Montana State Chamber of Commerce.

A couple of general points:

State nicknames are not popularized in the West until well into the 20th century, when there is the development of the complex of (1) the rise of the middle class, which begins to vacation; (2) the popularization of the automobile as the "family car"; (3) the rise of tourism on a paying basis; (4) the development of a network of good roads. There are private-sector companies pushing rail tourism prior to the 1920s--e.g., the Great Northern Railway with its Glacier National Park promotion of the "Alps of America," and the Northern Pacific Railroad's "Wonderland" promotion of Yellowstone National Park. These promotional campaigns, however, focus on the upper-class tourist and spotlight relatively limited areas of Montana, rather than the state as a whole. It would seem that those terms used for Montana by state-government offices prior 1905 were designed to attract outside investment capital and to promote permanent immigration under the early conservative federal laws, rather than to make the state attractive to tourists.

Second, no single office, agency, or group (in state government or outside state government) seems ever to have been in charge of designating an "official" nickname or slogan for Montana. Rather, the process was random and somewhat haphazard. For example, there are times when one state agency was using one nickname (or several nicknames/slogans) and a second agency simultaneously used another one; private-sector entities simultaneously used them all, or their own. One can argue that, currently, the Department of Commerce's Travel Promotion Bureau is the responsible party in this field, but there also are private-sector entities that believe that nicknames/slogans are their prerogative. In the end, common usage dictates what will become popular and what is recognized nationally. For example, the "Montana--Naturally Inviting" slogan died a slow, but quiet death. Thus, the Legislature can "officially" designate anything it wants as a nickname/slogan, but if it is an ineffective one, then the public will ignore it, and it will die of non-recognition.
**STROUDING**

- **n.** A kind of coarse woven cloth formerly much used in the Indian trade. *Obs. or hist.*

1814 BRACKENRIDGE *Vicar La.* 201 “The merchandise... consisted of strouding, blankets, etc.”

1886 CENT. MAG. Nov. 23/2 He and his sons gathered hazelnuts enough to barter at the nearest store for a few yards of blue strouding such as the Indians used for breech-clouts.

1947 Dey *Voyage Across Wide Missouri* 72 The Company is sending... a variety of cloths too diversified to list here, common cloths, stroudings and plaids, fancy calicos, flannels.

1955 M. STUARTIN *Stubble, a derogatory term for a person, esp. one who is old or short and stocky. Colloq.*

- **v.** To make, dress, or wear cloth in a rustic manner; to dress coarse or rough material in a manner befitting a humble or rustic state. *Obs.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>M. STUARTIN</td>
<td><em>Stubble, a derogatory term for a person, esp. one who is old or short and stocky. Colloq.</em></td>
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**STUDDED**

- **n.**

1. The stump or lower part of sugar cane remaining when the crop is cut; sugar cane growing from these stumps, in full stubble cane.

1827 in *Commons Dec. Hist.* 1. 214 Stubbles of Creole cane in new land mark the row.

2. In special combs: (1) stubble plow, (see quot.); (2) rye, rye sown on stubble, rare; (3) shearing, storn, (see quot.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>J. W. REEVE</td>
<td>*Number 156' Herndon noted as the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RUNNING LIST OF EXAMPLES OF MONTANA'S NICKNAMES/SLOGANS/MOTTOS/CATCH PHRASES FOUND IN VARIOUS SOURCES:

1893:  --no references


1894:  --no references

THE WORLD ALMANAC: In running the Montana Historical Society Library's collection of annual/biennial volumes of THE WORLD ALMANAC, no nickname appears for Montana from 1894 through 1921.

1895:  --no references


--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"

Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, MONTANA: "THE TREASURE STATE" (Helena: State Publishing; 1895)--title; p. 3.

1896:  --no references


1897:  --no references


1898:  --no references


1899:  --"The Treasure State"

Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT (Helena: Independent Publishing; 1899)--title page: "The Treasure State and Its Industries and Resources"; whole section (pp. 1-10) entitled "The Treasure State."
NICKNAMES: 2

(1899): --"The Treasure State"


1900: --"The Treasure State"

Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT (Helena: Independent Publishing; 1900)—full section (pp. 4-20) of promotional/informational material entitled "The Treasure State"; description of the motto (p. 4).

--"Oro y Plata" (official motto)

Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT (Helena: Independent Publishing; 1900)—full section (pp. 4-20) of promotional/informational material entitled "The Treasure State"; description of the motto (p. 4).


1902: --no references


1904: --no references


1906: --no references


1908: --no references


1909: --"The Treasure State"

Montana Department of Publicity, Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Industry, MONTANA (Helena: Department; 1909)—textual references, e.g., pp. 1 (title) and 40 (title).

1910: --no references

Montana Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, TWELFTH REPORT (Helena: Independent Publishing; 1911), Parts I and II.
NICKNAMES: 3

1912: "The Treasure State"
Montana Department of Publicity, Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Industry, MONTANA (Helena: Department; 1912)--textual references, e.g., Foreward; pp. 1 (title) and 4.

1914: --no references
Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, THE RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MONTANA, 1914 (Helena: Department; 1914).

1915: "The Treasure State"
Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, THE RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MONTANA (Helena: Department; 1915)--textual references (e.g., p. 5--title) and top, righthand headnotes throughout.

1916: "The Treasure State"
Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MONTANA (Helena: Department; 1916)--top, righthand headnotes throughout.

1917: --no references
Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MONTANA: "THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY," 1917 (Helena: Department; 1917).

1918: "The Treasure State"
Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MONTANA: "THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY," 1918 (Helena: Department; 1918)--textual references (e.g., p. 5--title).

1919: "The Treasure State" "The Switzerland of America"
Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, RESOURCES OF MONTANA: "THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY," 1919 (Helena: Department; 1919)--textual references (e.g., p. 5--title); the "Switzerland" nickname is applied (p. 12) to the whole state, not just to Glacier National Park.

"Oro y Plata"
THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1919 (although this was recognized as the state motto, the ALMANAC ran it as the state nickname).
NICKNAMES: 4

1920: --no references

Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, THE RESOURCES OF MONTANA: "THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY" (Helena: Department; 1920).

--no reference

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1920-1921 (although it did pull its 1919 citation of the state motto as the state nickname).

1921: --no reference

Montana Department of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, MONTANA: THE TOURIST EDITION (Helena: Department; 1921); although no nickname is used, the phrase "Montana: Vacation Land" is run in the border pattern on each page.

1922: --"The Stub Toe State" (aka "The Stubtoe State")
--"The Bonanza State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1922.

1923: --"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1923.

--no reference

Montana Department of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, MONTANA: INDUSTRIAL RESOURCE EDITION (Helena: Department; 1923).

--no reference

In the Montana Historical Society Library's run of annual updates to the ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, for the years 1923 through 1933, the "Montana" entry shows no state nickname—although some other states do show nicknames.

1924: --"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1924.

1925: --"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1925.
1926:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1926.

--"The Treasure State"

Montana Department of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, Division of Publicity, MONTANA: RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES EDITION, Vol. I, #1 (Helena: Department; 1926)—textual references (e.g., p. 11—title).

1927:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1927.

--"Montana—the Treasure and Pleasure State"

Letterhead of the Montana Stock and Bond Company, Butte.

1928:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1928.

--"The Treasure State"

Montana Department of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, Division of Publicity, MONTANA: RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES EDITION, Vol. III, #2 (Helena: Department; 1928)—textual references (e.g., p. 5).

1929:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1929.

1930:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1930.

1931:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1931.
NICKNAMES: 6

1932:
"The Stub Toe State"
"The Bonanza State"
"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1932.

1933:
"The Stub Toe State"
"The Bonanza State"
"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1933.

"The Treasure State"

Montana Department of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, Division of Publicity, MONTANA RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES, EDITION OF 1933, Vol. VII, #3 (Helena: Department; 1933)—textual references (e.g., p. 3—title).

1934:
"The Stub Toe State"
"The Bonanza State"
"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1934.

"The Treasure State"
"The Land of Shining Mountains"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1934 (this is the first Highway Department glove-compartment road map held by the Montana Historical Society Library).

1935:
"The Stub Toe State"
"The Bonanza State"
"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1935.

"The Treasure State"
"The Land of Shining Mountains"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1935.

no reference


1936:
"The Stub Toe State"
"The Bonanza State"
"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1936.

"The Land of Shining Mountains"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1936.
1937:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1937.

--"The Treasure State"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1937.

--no reference

THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1937.

1938:
--"The Stub Toe State"
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1938.

--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"Hitting the High Spots in Montana"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1938.

1939:
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1939 (with this issue of the ALMANAC, the nickname of "The Stub Toe State" is dropped, never to reappear).

--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"Out Where the West Lives On"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1939.

1940:
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1940.

--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"Out Where the West Lives On"
--"Roads to Romance"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1940.

1941:
--"The Bonanza State"
--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1941.

--"Montana: High, Wide, and Handsome"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"We Have More Scenery Than We Can Handle by Ourselves--Come On Out and Help Us Look at It"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1941.
1942:  "The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1942 (with this issue of the ALMANAC, the nickname of "The Bonanza State" is dropped, never to reappear; from this point to the present [1989], the only nickname that appears in the ALMANAC's annual issues is "The Treasure State").

--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"Montana: The Alluring and Soul-Satisfying"
--"Travel Strengthens America"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1942 (the Montana Historical Society Library's collection of state highway maps includes here a gap for the years 1943 through 1946; it is most likely that no maps were published during these war years).

1943:  "The Treasure State"

THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1943-1944.

--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1943.

1944:  "The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1944.

1945:  "The Treasure State"


--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1945.

1946:  "The Treasure State"

Montana Department of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry, MONTANA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS (Helena: Department; 1946)—in the Introduction by Governor Sam C. Ford, p. ii.

--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1946.

1947:  "The Treasure State"


--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"Montana: It Beckons—Satisfy That Urge"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1947.
NICKNAMES: 9

(1947):  "The Treasure State"


1948:

- "Montana: High, Wide and Handsome"
- "The Land of Shining Mountains"
- "Montana: It Beckons—Satisfy That Urge"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1948.

- "The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1948.

1949:

- no reference


- "The Treasure State"
- "The Land of Shining Mountains"
- "Montana: It Beckons—Satisfy That Urge"
- "The Nation's Playground"
- "The Land of Shining Opportunity"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1949.

- "The Treasure State"


1950:

- "The Treasure State"


- "The Treasure State"
- "The Land of Shining Mountains"
- "Magnificent Montana"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1950.

- "The Treasure State"

Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES, 1950 (this is the first instance, since state license plates were issued in 1914, that a nickname shows up on license plates; an outline of the State of Montana first appears in 1933—and it runs to the present).

- "The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1950.

1951:

- "The Treasure State"
- "The Land of Shining Mountains"
- "Friendly Montana"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1951.
NICKNAMES: 10

(1951):  
--"The Treasure State"

Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES, 1951.

--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1951.

1952:  
--"The Treasure State"


--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1952.

1953:  
--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"Majestic Montana"
--"You Will See More in Montana"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1953.

--"The Treasure State"

Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES, 1953.

--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1953.

1954:  
--"The Treasure State"


--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"
--"You Will See More in Montana"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1954.

--"The Treasure State"

THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1954.

1955:  
--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"


--"The Treasure State"


--"The Treasure State"

NICKNAMES: 11

1956:  
--"The Treasure State"
  

--"The Treasure State"
--"The Bonanza State"


--"The Treasure State"

  Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1956.

--"The Treasure State"

  THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1956.

1957:  
--"The Treasure State"

  Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1957.

--"The Treasure State"

  Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES, 1957.

--"The Treasure State"

  ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA YEARBOOK for 1957.

--"The Treasure State"

  THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1957.

1958:  
--"The Treasure State"


--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"

  Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1958.

--"The Treasure State"

  ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA YEARBOOK for 1958.

--"The Treasure State"


1959:  
--"The Treasure State"
--"The Land of Shining Mountains"

  Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1959.

--"The Treasure State"

NICKNAMES: 12

(1959): 
"The Treasure State"

ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA YEARBOOK for 1959.

"The Treasure State"


1960: 
"The Treasure State"


"The Treasure State"

"The Land of Shining Mountains"


"The Treasure State"

ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA YEARBOOK for 1960.

"The Treasure State"


1961: 
"The Treasure State"

"The Vacationer's Paradise"


"The Treasure State"

ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA YEARBOOK for 1961.

"The Treasure State"


1962: 
"The Big Sky Country"

"The Land of Shining Mountains"

"Montana: High, Wide, and Handsome"

"Everything To Do...And Beauty Too"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1962
(this is the first road map on which "Big Sky Country"
replaces "Treasure State").

"The Treasure State"

ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA YEARBOOK for 1962.

"The Treasure State"


1963: 

no reference

ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA YEARBOOKS (in the run of annual-update volumes for 1963 through 1975, no state nickname is given for Montana).
NICKNAMES: 13

(1963):

- "The Big Sky Country"
- "The Treasure State"
- "The Land of Shining Mountains"
- "The Four-Season Big-Sky Vacationland"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1963
(N.b.: both "Big Sky Country" and "Treasure State" are used).

- "The Treasure State"


- "The Treasure State"


1964:

- "The Big Sky Country"
- "The Treasure State"
- "The Big Sky Vacationland"


- "The Treasure State"


1965:

- "The Big Sky Country"
- "The Treasure State"
- "The Four-Season Big-Sky Vacationland"


- "The Treasure State"


1966:

- "The Big Sky Country"
- "The Treasure State"
- "Your Four-Season Big-Sky Vacationland"


- "The Treasure State"


1967:

- "The Big Sky Country"
- "The Treasure State"
- "Your Four-Season Big Sky Vacationland"


- "The Big Sky Country"

Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES, 1967 (N.b.: this is the first time that "Big Sky Country" replaces "Treasure State" on the license plates).
NICKNAMES: 14

(1967):  --"The Treasure State"

1968:    --"The Big Sky Country"
         --"The Treasure State"
         Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1968.
         --"Big Sky Country"
         --"The Treasure State"

1969:    --"The Big Sky Country"
         --"The Treasure State"
         Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1969.
         --"The Treasure State"

1970:    --"The Big Sky Country"
         --"The Treasure State"
         --"Escape to Montana...Where Magnificence is an Everyday Happening"
         --"The Four-Season Vacationland"
         Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1970.
         --no reference
         Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES, 1970 (new license plates were issued in 1970, but I cannot determine if they carried a nickname).
         --"The Treasure State"

1971:    --"The Big Sky Country"
         --"The Treasure State"
         --"The Great Escape...to Montana"
         --"Montana Is More Than a State of the Union--It Is a State of Mind"
         --"The Treasure State"
NICKNAMES: 15

1972:

--"The Big Sky Country"
--"The Treasure State"
--"Montana--Between Glacier and Yellowstone National Parks"


--"The Treasure State"


1973:

--"The Big Sky Country"
--"The Treasure State"
--"Montana--Between Glacier and Yellowstone National Parks"
--"Montana: A Four-Season Playground"
--"Montana: The Great Escape"


--no reference

Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES, 1973 (new license plates were issued in 1973, but I cannot determine if they carried a nickname).

--"The Treasure State"


1974:

--"The Big Sky Country"
--"The Treasure State"
--"Montana--Between Glacier and Yellowstone National Parks"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1974.

--"The Treasure State"


--"The Treasure State"


1975:

--"The Treasure State"
--"The Last of the Big Time Splendors"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1975.

--no reference

Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES (new U.S. Bicentennial license plates were issued in 1975, but I cannot determine if they carried a nickname).

--"The Treasure State"

NICKNAMES: 16

1976:  
--"The Treasure State"
--"Montana--Land of History and Adventure"
--"Montana--The Seeing and Doing Country"


--"The Treasure State"


1977:  
--"The Big Sky Country"
--"The Treasure State"
--"The Last of the Big Time Splendors"
--"Montana--Big as All Outdoors"


--"The Treasure State"


1978:  
--"The Treasure State"
--"The Last of the Big Time Splendors"
--"Montana--Big as All Outdoors"


--"The Treasure State"


1979:  
--"The Big Sky State"
--"The Treasure State"
--"The Last of the Big Time Splendors"


--"The Treasure State"


1980:  
--"The Big Sky Country"
--"The Treasure State"
--"The Last of the Big Time Splendors"


--"The Treasure State"


1981:  
--"The Big Sky"
--"The Treasure State"
--"Montana--the Four-Season Vacationland"

NICKNAMES: 17

1981: "The Treasure State"
THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1981.

1982: "The Treasure State"

1983: "The Big Sky"
"The Treasure State"
"Montana--the Four-Season Vacationland"
"Montana: Naturally Inviting"


"The Treasure State"
"The Big Sky Country"
"The Land of Shining Mountains"

THE HAMMOND ALMANAC, 1983.

"The Treasure State"
THE WORLD ALMANAC, 1983.

1984: "The Treasure State"

1985: "The Big Sky"
"Montana--Naturally Inviting"


"The Treasure State"

1986: "The Treasure State"

1987: "The Big Sky"
"Montana--Naturally Inviting"


"The Treasure State"
NICKNAMES: 18

1988: --no reference

Montana Registrar of Motor Vehicles, STATE LICENSE PLATES (optional Centennial license plates issued 1988ff.; carry no nickname).

"The Treasure State"


"Montana--Unspoiled, Unforgettable"

Montana Tourism Advisory Council competition winner.

1989: "Hitting the High Spots in Montana"

Montana Highway Commission, STATE HIGHWAY MAP, 1989-1990 (cover of map is a reprint of the cover/slogan from the 1938 map).